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10)Consider two firms producing the same good for a common market. Firm 1 has the cost...

10)Consider two firms producing the same good for a common market. Firm 1 has the cost function ofc(q1)=2q1 and firm 2 has the cost function of c(q2)=q2. Assuming they compete as Bertrandduopolists, what price would you expect to prevail?

a)1

b)2.5

c)2

d)3

need explain!

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Answer #1

Under the Bertrand Model, firms compete until price becomes equal to MC of production.

MC1 = 2

MC2 = 1

Firm 2 is more efficient , so it will survive the competition. Actual price will be $ 1

Answer: ( A)

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