4. Consider demand function ?=600−100? in a market with two firms with constant marginal cost ??....
4. Consider demand function ?=600−100? in a market with two
firms with constant marginal cost ??. Suppose a shareholder owns
60% of firm 1 and 30% of firm 2. If this
shareholder has control over firm 1, how will s/he want firm 1 to
choose its production level ?1 in response to firm 2’s production
level ?2? For this question, the shareholder takes ?2 as given.
Homework Answers
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4. Consider demand function ?=600−100? in a market with two
firms with constant marginal cost ??....
4. Consider demand function Q marginal cost mc. Suppose a shareholder owns 60% of firm 1...
4. Consider demand function Q marginal cost mc. Suppose a shareholder owns 60% of firm 1 and 30% of firm 2. If this 600-100P in a market with two firms with constant shareholder has control over firm 1, how will s/he want firm 1 to choose its production level q1 in response to firm 2's production level q2? For this question, the shareholder takes q2 as given.
Consider a market with demand function D(p)=10-p and firms with constant marginal cost MC=1. Assume that...
Consider a market with demand function D(p)=10-p and firms with
constant marginal cost MC=1. Assume that there is no fixed cost and
thus C(q1)=q1and C(q2)=q2
2. Suppose the owners of the two firms meet together secretly and agree to form a cartel. They choose a total level of production that maximizes their joint profits. They agree to split production and thus profits) equally (a) Suppose that both firms abide by their secret agreement. How much will each firm produce? What...
Consider two firms competing in a market with a demand function P=150-Q. Both firms have constant...
Consider two firms competing in a market with a demand function P=150-Q. Both firms have constant marginal cost c>0. There are no fixed costs. They compete by setting prices p₁ and p₂ simultaneously. (Bertrand game.) Which of the following statements is not correct? Select one: a. Both firms charging charging p = c is a Nash equilibrium. b. When firm 1 sets where is the industry monopoly price, firm 2's best response is to set . c. When p₁=c, any price p₂≥c...
Problem 1: Suppose that the market demand function is given by q-80-2p. All firms in the...
Problem 1: Suppose that the market demand function is given by q-80-2p. All firms in the industry have marginal cost of 10 and no fixed cost. In this problem, the firms compete in quantities. (a) What is the equilibrium price, quantity, consumer surplus, profit (producer surplus) and deadweight loss if there is only one firm in the industry? (b) Now answer the same question if there are two firms in the industry (duopoly). How does your answer compare to the...
Exercise: Consider a market in which two firms i = 1, 2 produce a homogeneous product at constant marginal cost c = 4, f...
Exercise: Consider a market in which two firms i = 1, 2 produce a homogeneous product at constant marginal cost c = 4, facing total demand described by the linear inverse demand curve P = 16 − Q. First assume that the firms compete by simultaneously choosing prices a la Bertrand. 1. Suppose that F1 expects F2 to set some price p2 above the marginal cost c but below the monopoly price p m. What is F1’s best response BR1(p2)...
Consider a market in which two firms i = 1,2 produce a homogeneousproduct at constant marginal...
Consider a market in which two firms i = 1,2 produce a homogeneousproduct at constant marginal cost c= 4, facing total demand described by the linear inverse demand curve P= 16−Q. First assume that the firms compete by simultaneously choosing prices a la Bertrand. a. Suppose that F1 expects F2 to set some price p2 above the marginal cost c but below the monopoly price pm. What is F1’s best response BR1(p2) to this price p2? b. What is the...
Consider the case of two firms competing in a market. Each firm has a constant marginal...
Consider the case of two firms competing in a market. Each firm has a constant marginal cost equal to $10. The demand function is D(p) = 100 − p (p is the price in cents) Firms are competing by choosing prices simultaneously. When prices are equal, each firm gets exactly one half of the total demand. P must be an integer value. 1. Find all the Nash equilibria of this duopoly game. 2. Calculate each firms profit under any equilibria. 3....
Consider two identical Cournot firms that have zero marginal cost facing the market inverse demand function:...
Consider two identical Cournot firms that have zero marginal cost facing the market inverse demand function: P = 100−1/2 Q What is the quantity produced by each firm? Round your answer to the nearest 1 decimal places.
Consider a homogeneous-product Cournot oligopoly with four firms. Suppose that the inverse demand function is P(Q)...
Consider a homogeneous-product Cournot oligopoly with four firms. Suppose that the inverse demand function is P(Q) = 64 – Q. Suppose that firms incur a constant marginal cost c = 4. Characterize the equilibrium of the game in which all firms simultaneously choose quantity. Suppose that firms 1 and 2 consider merging and that there are synergies leading to marginal costs cm < c. Characterize the new market equilibrium. At what level of cm are the two firms indifferent whether...
PROBLEM #1 Consider a market with two firms that sell products that are identical. Su market dema...
PROBLEM #1 Consider a market with two firms that sell products that are identical. Su market demand is as follows: P-56-Q , where Q measures the total output produced by both firms (that is, Q=q +q.) and qi and q, are the quantities produced by firm 1 and firm 2, respectively. The per-unit cost of production is $6 for each firm, and so the firm's cost functions are 6q, and 6q, respectively. Each firm seeks to maximize profits. The firms...
4. Consider demand function Q marginal cost mc. Suppose a shareholder owns 60% of firm 1 and 30% of firm 2. If this 600-100P in a market with two firms with constant shareholder has control over firm 1, how will s/he want firm 1 to choose its production level q1 in response to firm 2's production level q2? For this question, the shareholder takes q2 as given.
Consider a market with demand function D(p)=10-p and firms with
constant marginal cost MC=1. Assume that there is no fixed cost and
thus C(q1)=q1and C(q2)=q2
2. Suppose the owners of the two firms meet together secretly and agree to form a cartel. They choose a total level of production that maximizes their joint profits. They agree to split production and thus profits) equally (a) Suppose that both firms abide by their secret agreement. How much will each firm produce? What...
Problem 1: Suppose that the market demand function is given by q-80-2p. All firms in the industry have marginal cost of 10 and no fixed cost. In this problem, the firms compete in quantities. (a) What is the equilibrium price, quantity, consumer surplus, profit (producer surplus) and deadweight loss if there is only one firm in the industry? (b) Now answer the same question if there are two firms in the industry (duopoly). How does your answer compare to the...
PROBLEM #1 Consider a market with two firms that sell products that are identical. Su market demand is as follows: P-56-Q , where Q measures the total output produced by both firms (that is, Q=q +q.) and qi and q, are the quantities produced by firm 1 and firm 2, respectively. The per-unit cost of production is $6 for each firm, and so the firm's cost functions are 6q, and 6q, respectively. Each firm seeks to maximize profits. The firms...
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