Question

Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins 507 U.S. 604 (1993)

The Supreme Court resolved a split among the circuits in the following case, where it confronted the question of whether an employer violates the ADEA where factors other than age motivate the adverse employment decision. The Hazens hired Walter Biggins in 1977 and fired him in 1986 when he was 62 years old. Biggins sued, alleging a violation of the ADEA. The Hazens claimed instead that they terminated him because he did business with their competitors. A jury decided in favor of Biggins and the appellate court agreed, relying on evidence that the Hazens really fired him in order to prevent his pension benefits from vesting (which would have happened in the few weeks following his termination). In this case, the Supreme Court determines whether a firing decision based on a number of years served is “age-based.”

O‘Connor, J.

The Courts of Appeals repeatedly have faced the question whether an employer violates the ADEA by acting on the basis of a factor, such as an employee’s pension status or seniority, that is empirically correlated with age . . . . We now clarify that there is no disparate treatment under the ADEA when the factor motivating the employer is some feature other than the employee’s age.

In a disparate treatment case, liability depends on whether the protected trait (under the ADEA, age) actually motivated the employer’s decision. The employer may have relied upon a formal, facially discriminatory policy requiring adverse treatment of employees with that trait. Or the employer may have been motivated by the protected trait on an ad hoc, informal basis. Whatever the employer’s decision-making process, a disparate treatment claim cannot succeed unless the employee’s protected trait actually played a role in that process and had a determinative influence on the outcome.

Disparate treatment, thus defined, captures the essence of what Congress sought to prohibit in the ADEA. It is the very essence of age discrimination for an older employee to be fired because the employer believes that productivity and competence decline with old age.

“Although age discrimination rarely was based on the sort of animus motivating some other forms of discrimination, it was based in large part on stereotypes unsupported by objective fact. . . . Moreover, the available empirical evidence demonstrated that arbitrary age lines were in fact generally unfounded and that, as an overall matter, the performance of older workers was at least as good as that of younger workers.”

Thus the ADEA commands that “employers are to evaluate [older] employees . . . on their merits and not their age.” The employer cannot rely on age as a proxy for an employee’s remaining characteristics, such as productivity, but must instead focus on those factors directly.

When the employer’s decision is wholly motivated by factors other than age, the problem of inaccurate and stigmatizing stereotypes disappears. This is true even if the motivating factor is correlated with age, as pension status typically is. Pension plans typically provide that an employee’s accrued benefits will become nonforfeitable, page 627or “vested,” once the employee completes a certain number of years of service with the employer. On average, an older employee has had more years in the workforce than a younger employee, and thus may well have accumulated more years of service with a particular employer. Yet an employee’s age is analytically distinct from his years of service. An employee who is younger than 40, and therefore outside the class of older workers as defined by the ADEA, may have worked for a particular employer his entire career, while an older worker may have been newly hired. Because age and years of service are analytically distinct, an employer can take account of one while ignoring the other, and thus it is incorrect to say that a decision based on years of service is necessary “age-based.”

The instant case is illustrative. Under the Hazen Paper pension plan, as construed by the Court of Appeals, an employee’s pension benefits vest after the employee completes 10 years of service with the company. Perhaps it is true that older employees of Hazen Paper are more likely to be “close to vesting” than younger employees. Yet a decision by the company to fire an older employee solely because he has nine-plus years of service and therefore is “close to vesting” would not constitute discriminatory treatment on the basis of age. The prohibited stereotype (“Older employees are likely to be—”) would not have figured in this decision, and the attendant stigma would not ensue. The decision would not be the result of an inaccurate and denigrating generalization about age, but would rather represent an accurate judgment about the employee—that he indeed is “close to vesting.”

We do not mean to suggest that an employer lawfully could fire an employee in order to prevent his pension benefits from vesting. Such conduct is actionable under § 510 of ERISA. But it would not, without more, violate the ADEA. That law requires the employer to ignore an employee’s age (absent a statutory exemption or defense); it does not specify further characteristics that an employer must also ignore. . . .

We do not preclude the possibility that an employer who targets employees with a particular pension status on the assumption that these employees are likely to be older thereby engages in age discrimination. . . . Finally, we do not consider the special case where an employee is about to vest in pension benefits as a result of his age, rather than years of service, and the employer fires the employee in order to prevent vesting. That case is not presented here. Our holding is simply that an employer does not violate the ADEA just by interfering with an older employee’s pension benefits that would have vested by virtue of the employee’s years of service.

Case Questions

1. Do you agree with the court that age and years of service are sufficiently distinct to allow for terminations based on years of service and to find no violation of the ADEA where the terminations result in a greater proportion of older workers being fired?

2. Aren’t workers close to vesting more likely to be older workers? And, if so, then do you believe that an employer can use the category “close to vesting” to avoid liability under the ADEA?

3. If an employer did terminate a group of individuals on the basis of their being close to vesting with the intention of getting rid of older workers, what type of evidence would the employees/plaintiffs be able to use to prove the unlawful intent?

4. Answers must be original and no book answers, No plagiarism and must 450 words as the answer.

Answer 1

1. I do trust that age and long periods of administration are adequately unmistakable, yet I don't trust that this refinement ought to permit terminations dependent on long periods of administration without thought of an infringement of ADEA being considered. In this situation Biggins age ought to have been viewed as a factor, and it ought to be a thought in each condition where the individual is drawing near to retirement age and is coming up on vesting in their annuity. By considering age and annuity vesting while deciding if an ADEA infringement happened, this will deter business from firing workers to maintain a strategic distance from benefits payouts. Terminations dependent on long periods of administration could imply that a more noteworthy extent of more established laborers would be terminated, however I don't perceive how that could be a sensible protection since you could have numerous representatives who begin their vocation with an organization in there mid 20's that could be ended following 20 years of administration and just be in their 40's, which would not be an infringement of the ADEA.

2.Employees that are near vesting are likely more seasoned specialists. Businesses can utilize this and can refer to an alternate explanation behind the end. This sadly occurs be that as it may, it is also illegal.If a business did fire a gathering of people based on their being near vesting with the aim of disposing of more established specialists, what sort of proof would the employees/offended parties have the capacity to use to demonstrate the unlawful plan? Representatives that are near vesting are likely more established laborers. Managers can utilize this and can refer to an alternate explanation behind the end. This tragically occurs however it is additionally unlawful See Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon If a business terminated a gathering of people based on their being near vesting with the expectation of disposing of more seasoned laborers, what sort of proof would the representatives/offended parties have the capacity to use to demonstrate the unlawful intent?They would need to bring proof of different specialists that were terminated for very similar things to set up an example for the organization. In the event that you demonstrate that design, at that point you can follow them. Likewise any remarks made to you or activities that are significant to the case.

ages of specialists are not known for "work bouncing," due to this a great deal of more established laborers remain with associations for a long time and have just been vested in their annuities for a long time. Likewise vesting is controlled by every business, while some may have multi year vesting, different managers can have multi year vesting or multi year vesting. The "near vesting" class could be utilized to maintain a strategic distance from obligation under the ADEA, in any case, that does not imply that the business won't be at risk for infringement under some other demonstration, for example, ERISA.

3. The representatives/offended parties could take a gander at those people who are vested or near vesting that are not of a more established work bunch that are as yet utilized with the business. In the event that there is a significant measure of specialists who are vested or near vesting that are not of the more established gathering of laborers ended then that would give increasingly confirmation that the end was all the more so dependent on age.

Additionally, specialists could demonstrate that regardless they meet/surpass the desire and capabilities of the activity, and the end of their work had no legitimacy other than to keep away from an advantage payout to individuals that are near retirement age.