Consider the constant elasticity Cournot example from class. Two firms are facing market demand D(P) =...
Consider the constant elasticity Cournot example from class. Two firms are facing market demand D(P) = A/P^ε . Firms have constant marginal costs c1 and c2 respectively. Derive the expression for the equilibrium market power m1 of firm 1. If c1 = c2, then how does m1 depend on ε?
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Consider the constant elasticity Cournot example from class. Two
firms are facing market demand D(P) =...
Problem 4. Bertrand Competition with Different Costs Suppose two firms facing a demand D(p) compete by...
Problem 4. Bertrand Competition with Different Costs Suppose two firms facing a demand D(p) compete by setting prices simultaneously (Bertrand Competition). Firm 1 has a constant marginal cost ci and Firm 2 has a marginal cost c2. Assume ci < C2, i.e., Firm 1 is more efficient. Show that (unlike the case with identical costs) p1 = C1 and P2 = c2 is not a Bertrand equilibrium.
4. Consider 2 firms selling fertilizer competing as Cournot duopolists. The inverse demand function facing the...
4. Consider 2 firms selling fertilizer competing as Cournot duopolists. The inverse demand function facing the fertilizer market is P = 1 - where Q = 94 +98. For simplicity, assume that the long-run marginal cost for each firm is equal to X, i.e. C(q)=Xq for each firm. a) Find the Cournot Nash equilibrium where the firms choose output simultaneously b) Find the Stackelberg Nash Equilibrium where firm A as the Stackelberg leader. How much does the leader gain by...
Consider two identical Cournot firms that have zero marginal cost facing the market inverse demand function:...
Consider two identical Cournot firms that have zero marginal cost facing the market inverse demand function: P = 100−1/2 Q What is the quantity produced by each firm? Round your answer to the nearest 1 decimal places.
4. (12 MARKS -6 FOR EACH PART) Two firms produce homogeneous products and compete as Cournot...
4. (12 MARKS -6 FOR EACH PART) Two firms produce homogeneous products and compete as Cournot duopolists. Inverse market demand is given by P 30 Q. Firm 1 has a marginal cost of 5 per unit. Firm 2's marginal cost is c2<5. (a) Suppose that c2 falls. What will happen to the Cournot equilibriumi) price, (ii) consumer surplus and total surplus, and (ii) the HHI? Explain your answer. (b) How does this example relate to criticisms of the use of...
Consider two identical Cournot firms that each have a marginal cost of 20, facing the market...
Consider two identical Cournot firms that each have a marginal cost of 20, facing the market inverse demand function: P=120-Q What is the quantity produced for each firm? Round your answer to the nearest 1 decimal places.
Demand in a market dominated by two firms (a Cournot duopoly) is determined according to: P...
Demand in a market dominated by two firms (a Cournot duopoly) is determined according to: P = 300 – 4(Q1 + Q2), where P is the market price, Q1 is the quantity demanded by Firm 1, and Q2 is the quantity demanded by Firm 2. The marginal cost and average cost for each firm is constant; AC=MC = $74. The cournot-duopoly equilibrium profit for each firm is
Consider a market with two firms in Cournot (quantity) competition. Market demand is given by q(p)...
Consider a market with two firms in Cournot (quantity) competition. Market demand is given by q(p) = a − p. Each firm faces a constant marginal cost of c. a. (15 points) Suppose that the government imposes a unit tax of δ, so that if a firm sells q units of the good, that firm owes q · δ to the government. Find the equilibrium quantity, price paid by consumers, consumer surplus, and tax revenue. Your answers should be functions...
Cournot: Consider a Cournot duopoly in which firms A and B simultaneously choose quantity. Both firms...
Cournot: Consider a Cournot duopoly in which firms A and B simultaneously choose quantity. Both firms have constant marginal cost of $20 and zero fixed cost. Market demand is given by: P = 140 − qA − qB. (a) Derive the best-response functions for each firm and plot them on the same graph. (b) Calculate the profits of each firm in the Nash Equilibrium outcome.
2. (Cournot Model) Consider a Cournot duopoly. The market demand is p=160 - q2. Firm 1's...
2. (Cournot Model) Consider a Cournot duopoly. The market demand is p=160 - q2. Firm 1's marginal cost is 10, and firm 2's marginal cost is also 10. There are no fixed costs. A. Derive each firm's best response function B. What is the Nash equilibrium of this model? Find the equilibrium market price. C. Find the equilibrium profit for each firm D. Find the equilibrium consumer surplus in this market. 3. (Bertrand Model) Consider a Bertrand duopoly. The market...
Demand in a market dominated by two firms (a Cournot duopoly) is determined according to: P...
Demand in a market dominated by two firms (a Cournot duopoly) is determined according to: P = 200 – 2(Q1 + Q2), where P is the market price, Q1 is the quantity demanded by Firm 1, and Q2 is the quantity demanded by Firm 2. The marginal cost and average cost for each firm is constant; AC=MC = $75. The cournot-duopoly equilibrium quantity produced by each firm is _____. Hint: Write your answer to two decimal places.
Problem 4. Bertrand Competition with Different Costs Suppose two firms facing a demand D(p) compete by setting prices simultaneously (Bertrand Competition). Firm 1 has a constant marginal cost ci and Firm 2 has a marginal cost c2. Assume ci < C2, i.e., Firm 1 is more efficient. Show that (unlike the case with identical costs) p1 = C1 and P2 = c2 is not a Bertrand equilibrium.
4. Consider 2 firms selling fertilizer competing as Cournot duopolists. The inverse demand function facing the fertilizer market is P = 1 - where Q = 94 +98. For simplicity, assume that the long-run marginal cost for each firm is equal to X, i.e. C(q)=Xq for each firm. a) Find the Cournot Nash equilibrium where the firms choose output simultaneously b) Find the Stackelberg Nash Equilibrium where firm A as the Stackelberg leader. How much does the leader gain by...
4. (12 MARKS -6 FOR EACH PART) Two firms produce homogeneous products and compete as Cournot duopolists. Inverse market demand is given by P 30 Q. Firm 1 has a marginal cost of 5 per unit. Firm 2's marginal cost is c2<5. (a) Suppose that c2 falls. What will happen to the Cournot equilibriumi) price, (ii) consumer surplus and total surplus, and (ii) the HHI? Explain your answer. (b) How does this example relate to criticisms of the use of...
2. (Cournot Model) Consider a Cournot duopoly. The market demand is p=160 - q2. Firm 1's marginal cost is 10, and firm 2's marginal cost is also 10. There are no fixed costs. A. Derive each firm's best response function B. What is the Nash equilibrium of this model? Find the equilibrium market price. C. Find the equilibrium profit for each firm D. Find the equilibrium consumer surplus in this market. 3. (Bertrand Model) Consider a Bertrand duopoly. The market...
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