Problem 1. Ultimatum Game with Inequality Aversion Players 1 and 2 are in an ultimatum game and will divide a part...

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Problem 1. Ultimatum Game with Inequality Aversion Players 1 and 2 are in an ultimatum game and will divide a particular good

where Thus each player values the amount they receive minus a correction that is proportional to the difference between z and

business economics

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oimi 2. 2. and 0%,%) uut be aceptable。 e be Same gou for u Hence ( gecond prayes 2. 2 tu

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Problem 1. Ultimatum Game with Inequality Aversion Players 1 and 2 are in an ultimatum game and will divide a part...

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