Problem 1. Ultimatum Game with Inequality Aversion Players 1 and 2 are in an ultimatum game and will divide a part...

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Problem 1. Ultimatum Game with Inequality Aversion Players 1 and 2 are in an ultimatum game and will divide a particular good

where Thus each player values the amount they receive minus a correction that is proportional to the difference between z and

math Advanced-Math

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