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1. Consider the following game between a penalty kicker and a goalkeeper: Goalie Left Center Right 30,70 60,40 80,20 40,60 20

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Solution: 1 Giren game between penalty kickey and a goalkeeper. Goalie left conter 30,70 60140 40,60 90, 80 Kickey Right 80,2b If Kickers Comter Strategy eliminated, the goalie will not want to play Center? -) If kicker center strategy is eliminated

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