Question

Question 16 (1 point) The following information pertains to Questions 16-20 Consider one round of the penalty shoot-outs in hockey (The kicker kicks the ball, the goalie tries to save). This is a simultaneous game. The kicker has two strategies: Kick left and kick right. The goalie also has two strategles: Dive to the left, and dive to the right. The payoffs are given below. The rows correspond to the strategles of the Kicker, and columns correspond to that of the goalie. As always, the first number in each cell is the payoff of the Kicker, and the second number is the payoff of the Goalie) Goalie Left Right Kicker Left S0, 50 80, 20 Right 90,10 60, 60 11. What is Goalie's best response when kicker kicks to the left? Left Right Elther Left or Right Neither Left nor Right Question 17 (1 point) 17. What is Goalie's best response when kicker kicks to the Right? Left Right Either Left or Right Neither Left or Right Question 18 (1 point) 18. Does the Goalie have a dominant strategy? Yes, he should always go ight Yes, he should always go left No, his best response depends on kicker's strategy There is not enough information to determine that. Question 19 (1 point) 19. What is the pure stratery Nash Equilibrium of this game? Left, Left Left, Ripht Right, Left Right, Right This game doesn't have a pure stratcry Nash equilibrium. Question 20 (1 point) 20. Let (p,1-p) be the mixing probabillties of the kicker (that is, kicker kicks to the lett with probability p, and to the right wlth probabil ty 1-p), and (q,1-q) be the mlxing prabablilities of the goalle. What Is the Mxed strategy Nash equillbrium in this game? p-0.875, q-0.125 p-0.625, q-0.333 p-0.375, q-0.666 p-0.500, q-0.500

Answer 1

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