Problem 1: (20 points) For the normal form game shown below find: (a) (10 points) the set of Nash equilibria. (b) (5...
#1. (30 points) Consider the following normal-form game. (a) (10 points) Find all pure strategy Nash equilibria. (b) (20 points) Find all mixed strategy Nash equilibria. EFG | A 0,0 3, 4, 1 B5,5 0,01,-1 C 2.0 1,0 2,6 D 1,0 1,4 6,3
Problem 2: Consider the following normal form game: | A | B | C D L 2 ,3 -1,3 0,0 4,3 M -1,0 3,0 / 0,10 2,0 R 1,1 | 2,1 3,1 3,1 Part a: What are the pure strategies that are strictly dominated in the above game? Part 6: What are the rationalizable strategies for each player? What are all the rationalizable strategy profiles? Part c: Find all of the Nash equilibria of the game above.
2. Write the game below in normal form and find all Nash equilibria. a b 16,-10 4,0 + P1 a b 10,6 2,2 posle Z Nature of P2 a 0,2 p= 14 la
1. Consider the following game in normal form. Player 1 is the "row" player with strate- gies a, b, c, d and Player 2 is the "column" player with strategies w, x, y, 2. The game is presented in the following matrix: a b c d w 3,3 1,1 0,0 0,0 x 2,1 1,2 1,0 0,5 y 0,2 1,0 3, 2 0,2 z 2,1 1,4 1,1 3,1 (a) Find the set of rationalizable strategies. (b) Find the set of Nash...
Question 5: Write the normal form of the following game. Find all its Nash equilibria. Find one SPNE M a b 3 3 1 0 0 Y 0 0 x 1 1 y 2 1 1 2 1 2. 2 1
Find all pure strategy Nash equilibria (NE) by writing down a normal form representation and subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE). Are the set of NE the same as the set of SPNE? If not, briefly explain why some of the NE is not SPNE. U D L R R (2.1) (0.0) (-1, 1) (3,2)
Consider the following extensive-form game with two players, 1 and 2. a). Find the pure-strategy Nash equilibria of the game. [8 Marks] b). Find the pure-strategy subgame-perfect equilibria of the game. [6 Marks] c). Derive the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium of the subgame. If players play this mixed Nash equilibrium in the subgame, would 1 player In or Out at the initial mode? [6 Marks] [Hint: Write down the normal-form of the subgame and derive the mixed Nash equilibrium of...
3. Consider the following game in normal form. Player 1 is the "row" player with strate- gies a, b, c, d and Player 2 is the "column" player with strategies w, x, y, z. The game is presented in the following matrix: W Z X y a 3,3 2,1 0,2 2,1 b 1,1 1,2 1,0 1,4 0,0 1,0 3,2 1,1 d 0,0 0,5 0,2 3,1 с Find all the Nash equilibria in the game in pure strategies.
Froblem #5: Convert extensive-form to strategic-form, find Nash equilibria and subgame. perfect Nash equilibria (12pts) Consider the following extensive-form game: Veto Y Don't Veto In this game, Players 1 and 2 are deciding on a course of action, which may be X, Y, or Z Player 2 is the one who actually makes the choice, but first Player may choose to veto Y, which is the option Player 1 prefers the least. a) List all the strategies available to Player...
Problem 10 Find all pure-strategy Nash Equilibria of the three-player game below. Notice that player 3 has four strategies from which to select, represented by the four matrices. Matrix W Matrix X Matrix Y Matrix Z = 5.5" LR LR LR 1,0,3 A B 1,0,3 2,2,2 1,0,3 0,0,1 A B 1,0,3 1,0,3 2,2,2 0,3,3 A B 1,0,2 1,0,2 2,2,2 0,0,1 A B 1,0,2 1,0,2 2,2,2 0,3,3