I SEE THAT SOME PEOPLE SAY A, AND OTHERS SAY C. WHICH ONE IS CORRECT, OR ARE THEY BOTH CORRECT?
Homework Answers
Option C.
The above mentioned game does not have an equilibrium in pure strategy. Because in all the cases, the another person has an incentive to deviate from the strategy. Since there is no equilibrium in pure strategy, the game will have equilibrium in mixed strategy.Thus, there is mixed strategy equilibrium in the game.
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I SEE THAT SOME PEOPLE SAY A, AND OTHERS SAY C. WHICH ONE IS CORRECT, OR...
a.) Find all pure-strategy Nash equilibria. b.) *Find all mixed-strategy Nash equilibria. c.) Explain why, in...
a.) Find all pure-strategy Nash equilibria.
b.) *Find all mixed-strategy Nash equilibria.
c.) Explain why, in any mixed-strategy equilibrium, each player
must be indifferent between the pure strategies that she randomizes
over.
Consider the following game: - 2 LR 2
Consider the following extensive-form game with two players, 1 and 2. a). Find the pure-strategy Nash...
Consider the following extensive-form game with two players, 1
and 2.
a). Find the pure-strategy Nash equilibria of the game. [8
Marks]
b). Find the pure-strategy subgame-perfect equilibria of the
game. [6 Marks]
c). Derive the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium of the subgame.
If players play this mixed Nash equilibrium in the subgame, would 1
player In or Out at the initial mode? [6 Marks]
[Hint: Write down the normal-form of the subgame and derive the
mixed Nash equilibrium of...
My question is about game theory. Say we have a game with mixed equilibria, but no...
My question is about game theory. Say we have a game with mixed equilibria, but no pure Nash equilibria. How does the strategy of one player affect the strategy of the other player in a mixed equilibrium?
3. Consider the following two-player game in strategic form LM R A 2,2 2,2 2,2 В 3,3 0,2 0,0 С 0,...
3. Consider the following two-player game in strategic form LM R A 2,2 2,2 2,2 В 3,3 0,2 0,0 С 0,0 3,2 0,3 This game will demonstrate several methods for ruling out possible mixed- strategy equilibria (a) What are the pure strategy equilibria? (b) Show that there does not exist an equilibrium in which Player 1 (the row player) assigns strictly positive probability to A, to B, and to C. (c) Show that there does not exist an equilibrium in...
3. (30 pts) Consider the following game. Players can choose either left () or 'right' (r) The tab...
3. (30 pts) Consider the following game. Players can choose either left () or 'right' (r) The table provided below gives the payoffs to player A and B given any set of choices, where player A's payoff is the firat number and player B's payoff is the second number Player B Player A 4,4 1,6 r 6,1 -3.-3 (a) Solve for the pure strategy Nash equilibria. (4 pta) (b) Suppose player A chooses l with probability p and player B...
(2,5). Find the Walrasian equilibrium. 4. 120] Answer the following. (a) 14 Explain the difference between...
(2,5). Find the Walrasian equilibrium. 4. 120] Answer the following. (a) 14 Explain the difference between a strategy that is a best response versus a strategy that is strictly dominant. (b) (6) Consider the following game: player 2 D E F C A 3,7 7,3 1,2 4,3 player 1 B 8,9 8,5 2,8 5,2 C 0,10 7,01,9 2,2 Find the strictly dominant strategies solution and the iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies solution, if any. (c) [10] Consider the following...
Q.2 Consider the following normal-form game: Player 2 Player 1 3,2 1,1 -1,3 R. 0,0 Q.2.a...
Q.2 Consider the following normal-form game: Player 2 Player 1 3,2 1,1 -1,3 R. 0,0 Q.2.a Identify the pure-strategy Nash equilibria. Q.2.b Identify the mixed-strategy Nash equilibria Q.2.c Calculate each player's expected equilibrium payoff.
3. For each of the following statements, say whether it is true or false, and explain...
3. For each of the following statements, say whether it is true or false, and explain your answer. (a) "A roll-back equilibrium is not a Nash equilibrium.. (b) "If a simultaneous-move game has pure strategy equilibria, the game cannot have mixed strategy equilibria too." (c) "Players who have a strictly dominant pure strategy will never choose to play a mixed strategy."
Player lI A 6,6 2,0 В 0,1 а,а Player Consider the game represented above in which...
Player lI A 6,6 2,0 В 0,1 а,а Player Consider the game represented above in which BOTH Player 1 and Player 2 get a payoff of "a" when the strategy profile played is (B,D). Select the correct answer. If a-1 then strategy B is strictly dominated If a-3/2 then the game has two pure strategy Nash Equilibria. For all values of "a" strategy A is strictly dominant. For small enough values of "a", the profile (A,D) is a pure strategy...
player 2 H T player 1 H 1,-1 -1,1 T -1,1 1,-1 Consider a game of...
player 2 H T player 1 H 1,-1 -1,1 T -1,1 1,-1 Consider a game of matching pennies as described above. If the pennies match player 2 pays player 1 $1 (both get head or tail). If the pennies are not matched player 1 pays player 2 $1 ( head , tail or tail , head). H represents heads and T represents Tails 1. (2 points) What is the set of strategies for each player? 2. (5 points) Is there...
a.) Find all pure-strategy Nash equilibria.
b.) *Find all mixed-strategy Nash equilibria.
c.) Explain why, in any mixed-strategy equilibrium, each player
must be indifferent between the pure strategies that she randomizes
over.
Consider the following game: - 2 LR 2
Consider the following extensive-form game with two players, 1
and 2.
a). Find the pure-strategy Nash equilibria of the game. [8
Marks]
b). Find the pure-strategy subgame-perfect equilibria of the
game. [6 Marks]
c). Derive the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium of the subgame.
If players play this mixed Nash equilibrium in the subgame, would 1
player In or Out at the initial mode? [6 Marks]
[Hint: Write down the normal-form of the subgame and derive the
mixed Nash equilibrium of...
3. Consider the following two-player game in strategic form LM R A 2,2 2,2 2,2 В 3,3 0,2 0,0 С 0,0 3,2 0,3 This game will demonstrate several methods for ruling out possible mixed- strategy equilibria (a) What are the pure strategy equilibria? (b) Show that there does not exist an equilibrium in which Player 1 (the row player) assigns strictly positive probability to A, to B, and to C. (c) Show that there does not exist an equilibrium in...
3. (30 pts) Consider the following game. Players can choose either left () or 'right' (r) The table provided below gives the payoffs to player A and B given any set of choices, where player A's payoff is the firat number and player B's payoff is the second number Player B Player A 4,4 1,6 r 6,1 -3.-3 (a) Solve for the pure strategy Nash equilibria. (4 pta) (b) Suppose player A chooses l with probability p and player B...
(2,5). Find the Walrasian equilibrium. 4. 120] Answer the following. (a) 14 Explain the difference between a strategy that is a best response versus a strategy that is strictly dominant. (b) (6) Consider the following game: player 2 D E F C A 3,7 7,3 1,2 4,3 player 1 B 8,9 8,5 2,8 5,2 C 0,10 7,01,9 2,2 Find the strictly dominant strategies solution and the iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies solution, if any. (c) [10] Consider the following...
Q.2 Consider the following normal-form game: Player 2 Player 1 3,2 1,1 -1,3 R. 0,0 Q.2.a Identify the pure-strategy Nash equilibria. Q.2.b Identify the mixed-strategy Nash equilibria Q.2.c Calculate each player's expected equilibrium payoff.
3. For each of the following statements, say whether it is true or false, and explain your answer. (a) "A roll-back equilibrium is not a Nash equilibrium.. (b) "If a simultaneous-move game has pure strategy equilibria, the game cannot have mixed strategy equilibria too." (c) "Players who have a strictly dominant pure strategy will never choose to play a mixed strategy."
Player lI A 6,6 2,0 В 0,1 а,а Player Consider the game represented above in which BOTH Player 1 and Player 2 get a payoff of "a" when the strategy profile played is (B,D). Select the correct answer. If a-1 then strategy B is strictly dominated If a-3/2 then the game has two pure strategy Nash Equilibria. For all values of "a" strategy A is strictly dominant. For small enough values of "a", the profile (A,D) is a pure strategy...
player 2 H T player 1 H 1,-1 -1,1 T -1,1 1,-1 Consider a game of matching pennies as described above. If the pennies match player 2 pays player 1 $1 (both get head or tail). If the pennies are not matched player 1 pays player 2 $1 ( head , tail or tail , head). H represents heads and T represents Tails 1. (2 points) What is the set of strategies for each player? 2. (5 points) Is there...
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