ANSWER:
To compute the payoffs in mixed strategy Nash equilibria, do the below mentioned steps:
-- The mixed strategy Nash equilibrium should be solved. Note the probabilities of playing each strategy next to such strategies.
-- For each cell, the probability player 1 plays his corresponding strategy should be multiplied by the probability player 2 plays to the corresponding strategy. Write this in the cell.
-- Select the player whose payoff need to be computed. Multiply each probability in each cell by the payoff in that cell.
-- Add all these numbers and it will provide the expected payoff in the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium for that player.
Can you please explain how to calculate mixed strategy of a game using probabilities to derive...
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