Please show all your work.
Your firm has total costs equal to 40Q1. Firm 2 has total costs of 50Q2. The demand you face is P=4000-5Q. You are the Stackelberg leader and firm 2 is the
Stackelberg follower. What is your output and profits?
The price curve for the product is P = 4000 - 5(Q1 + Q2)
Hence, profit curve for firm 1 = F1 = P*Q1 - C(Q1) = (4000 - 5 (Q1 + Q2))*Q1 - 40Q1 = 3660Q1 - 5Q12 - 5Q1Q2
Similarly, profit curve for firm 2 = F2 = P*Q2 - C(Q2) = (4000 - 5 (Q1 + Q2)) - 50Q2 = 3650Q1 - 5Q12 - 5Q1Q2
Hence, reaction curve for firm 1 and firm 2 are;
Now, firm 1 is being the leader. Hence, substituting firm 2's reaction function in firm 1's profit function, we have;
Maximizinf F1, we have;
Hence, Firm 1's output = 22010/60 = 366.83 = 367 say
Hence, Firm 1's profit is;
Please show all your work. Your firm has total costs equal to 40Q1. Firm 2 has...
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Please show step by step.
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