Question 1 and 2 are separate question! 1. Please answer all of the followings. Consider a...

Question

Question

Question 1 and 2 are separate question!

1. Please answer all of the followings.

Consider a game in which player 1 moves first. The set of actions available to player 1 is A₁={A,B,C}.

After observing the choice of player 1, player 2 moves. The set of actions available to player 2 is A₂={a,b,c,d}.

How many strategies does each of player 1 and player 2 have? At how many information sets does player 2 move?

a. Player 1 has () strategies.

b. Player 2 has () strategies.

c. Player 2 moves at () information sets.

2. In below game representation, how many strategies does each of Emily and Nina have? At how many information sets does Emily move?

3,3 3, 3 3,4 1, 2 4,3 2,1 2, 2 2,2 EMILY NINA EMILY EMILY NINA EMILYg

a. Nina has () strategies.

b. Emily has () strategies.

c. Emily moves at () information sets.

Answer 1

Answer #1

4)la 1 Hou es fist, Cequeutal Gaswe) - P2 moves a zeno() 4nforsh ses , P1 Me- 2 SA, 8,3 82-) ame Ov Nina

Answer 2

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