1. write the normal form of this game
consider the following game in normal form: Consider the following game in normal form: Player B BY B2 B3 9,9 2,4 1,11 Player A 3,2 11,0 2,7 A3 10,3 4,2 9,11 Which of the following is TRUE? O A3 dominates A2 O B3 is a dominant strategy for Player B. O A3 is a dominant strategy for Player A. The game has dominant equilibrium A3, B3.
write down the normal form of this game 2 (yジ し3
QUESTION 4. (25 pts) Write down the Normal form of the following game. 2 Х + (11,9) 1 Y (100, 17) V E 2 (0,0) A W (0,3) 1 (6,-8) V B C 2 W (4, 12) (11, 14)
Game Theory 7. Consider the following normal form game 1 2 A B A 1,4 2,0 B 0,8 3,9 Determine all of the Nash equilibria (pure and mixed) for this game.
3. Represent the following extensive form game in a normal form game.(2 points) P1 Top Bottom P2 L L P1 (5,5) (1,1) R. (3,1) (1,3) (-1,-1) (0,0)
2. Write the game below in normal form and find all Nash equilibria. a b 16,-10 4,0 + P1 a b 10,6 2,2 posle Z Nature of P2 a 0,2 p= 14 la
1. The following is the extensive-form representation (omitting payoffs) of a game: ·N = {1, 2, 3): . H = 10, A, B, C. Ay, An, Ayy, Ayr, Any, Ann. Ba, Bb. Bc,CY.CN,CYY, CYN,CNY, CNN): ·Z = {Ayy, Ayn, Any, Ann, Ba, Bb. Bc, CYy, CYN,CNY, CNN): (1) Draw the corresponding game tree of the game; (8 points) (2) Write down the sets of strategies for each player; (7 points) (3) Suppose the information sets in this game are: (0),...
Question 5: Write the normal form of the following game. Find all its Nash equilibria. Find one SPNE M a b 3 3 1 0 0 Y 0 0 x 1 1 y 2 1 1 2 1 2. 2 1
3. General Extensive Form Game D Suppose the following general extensive form game 1/2 1/2 (2, 2) (2, 2) (0, 6) (6, 0 (0,0 (6, 4) (a) Represent this game in normal form by using a matrix, and find all pure strategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium (equilibria) b) Find pure strategy subgame perfect equilibrium (or equilibria) of this game. c) Find pure strategy perfect Bayesian equilibrium (or equilibria) of this game.
1. Consider the following extensive form game with perfect information 1 Out 2 2 In 3 3 a) (Level A) Write down the normal form associated with this extensive form game (b) (Level A) First suppose -0. Find a subgame perfect equilibrium for this game (c) (Level B) Again suppose α-0. Find a pure strategy ash equilibrium of this extensive form game that is not subgame perfect (d) (Level B) Now suppose a-3. Find all pure strategy subgame perfect equi-...