Homework Answers
Answer: Option C: 9<x<11 , 9<y<10
Since in prisoner dilemma output would be (x, 9) since there is always incentive to non cooperate for each player . If player 2 chooses confess then player 1's dominant strategy would be cooperative so x >9 and since in prisoner dilemma their best interest is (11,y) so x should be less than 11.
So 9<x<11
And If player 1 choose not to confess then player 2's strategy would be confession to make it as prisoner dilemma problem. So y should be less than 10 and greater than 9 because (9,y) is the best output of this game.
So 9<y<10
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