First understand the diagram which says that if player 1 chooses A and player 2 chooses X, then player 1 gets 3 as payoff while player 2 gets 0 payoff. This means that in (3,0), the payoff of player 1 is represented on left while payoff of player 2 is represented in right of bracket.
If player 1 chooses A, player 2 have two options which is to choose X or Y. Player 2 will anyday choose Y as she will get 3 as payoff in comparison of 0 if she chooses X. It will give player 1 payoff equals to 0.
If player 1 chooses B, player 2 again have two options to choose either X or Y. Player 2 will choose X as it gives her maximum payoff which gives 0 payoff to player 1.
If player 1 chooses C, player 1 will get 1 as well as Y will get 1.
So, player 1 can secure her payoff of 1 while selecting C which makes her rational in selecting it.
PROBLEM 4 In the game pictured in Figure 2 is it ever rational for player 1...
QUESTTON 4 Player Il E D A 3,34,21,4 B 2,0 3,0-1,1 с 1,1 2,1 0,2 Player Consider the game above. Select all that apply. a Strategy B weakly dominates C. Strategy D weakly dominates E. c. The game does not have a dominant strategy solution. d. F is a dominant strategy. e. (A,D) is the dominant strategy solution.
Consider the Prisoner's Dilemma payoff matrix: Player 2 Player 1 Tell Silent Tell 1,1 3,0 Silent 0,3 2,2 Suppose that this is a sequential game in which Player 1 moves first and Player 2 follows, after seeing Player 1's action. Draw the game tree and solve for all pure strategy SPNE.
Game theory
Player 2 DEF A 1,1 1,11,1 Player I B ,8 7,51,1 C5,7 8,3 1,1 The following strategy profiles are stage Nash equilibria (select all that apply) a.(C,D b. (B,E R2. С. (AP) O e. (CE) . (B,F
Please answer 3 Questions, thank you.
4. Consider the following game: PLAYER 2 (0,3) (2,0) (1,7) PLAYER 1 (2,4) (0,6) (2,0) (1,3) (2,4) (0,3) a) Does this game have any pure-strategy Nash equilibrium? If so, identify it (or them) and explain why this is an equilibrium. b) Find a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium to this game and explain your calculations. Note: a mixed strategy for player i may be expressed by o; = (P1, P2, 1- P1 - p2). c) Is...
Player E A Player 3,3 4,2 1,4 2,0 3,0 -1,1 1,1 C 2,-1 0,2 The iterative elimination of dominated strategies (IEDS) solution is the strategy profile consisting in strategy for Player 1 and for Player 2 strategy
Player E A Player 3,3 4,2 1,4 2,0 3,0 -1,1 1,1 C 2,-1 0,2 The iterative elimination of dominated strategies (IEDS) solution is the strategy profile consisting in strategy for Player 1 and for Player 2 strategy
QUESTION 9 Consider the stage game below and suppose it is repeated twice Player 2 D E F A 1,1 1,1 1,1 Player I B 1,8 7,5 1.1 с 5,7 | 8,3 | 1,1 The following strategy profiles are stage Nash equilibria (select all that apply) e (B,E
3. Consider the following two-player game in strategic form LM R A 2,2 2,2 2,2 В 3,3 0,2 0,0 С 0,0 3,2 0,3 This game will demonstrate several methods for ruling out possible mixed- strategy equilibria (a) What are the pure strategy equilibria? (b) Show that there does not exist an equilibrium in which Player 1 (the row player) assigns strictly positive probability to A, to B, and to C. (c) Show that there does not exist an equilibrium in...
Consider the strategic form game above. The number of strategies
player 1 has is and player 2 moves
at information sets (Please write
numerical values like 0,1, 74, etc.).
We were unable to transcribe this imagePlayer lI D E A 2,6 0A 4A В 3,3 0,0 1,5 С 1,1 3,5 2,3 Player
Find all pure strategy Nash Equilibria in the following games a.) Player 2 b1 b2 b3 a1 1,3 2,2 1,2 a2 2,3 2,3 2,1 a3 1,1 1,2 3,2 a4 1,2 3,1 2,3 Player 1 b.) Player 2 A B C D A 1,3 3,1 0,2 1,1 B 1,2 1,2 2,3 1,1 C 3,2 2,1 1,3 0,3 D 2,0 3,0 1,1 2,2 Player 1 c.) Player 2 S B S 3,2 1,1 B 0,0 2,3
In this game, which of the player(s) has/have a dominant
strategy?
A. Player 1 has a dominant strategy
B. Player 2 has a dominant strategy
C. Both players have a dominant strategy
Player 2 SILENT FiNK player/ 4-28 (0,0) | 13,-1) |(1,3)|(1,1) vi-jual-