Question

Frankie Ferrara Part A Frankie Ferrara is a veteran rock musician. In the late 1970’s, Frankie’s albums were regular mainstays on the Billboard charts. Ferrara has made something of a comeback in the last few years, and today his fans include both teenagers and Baby Boomers. Frankie is finalizing plans for a three month Northeast tour. His schedule is complete except for a show in Boston. Frankie is currently negotiating with Night Howl, a popular club in downtown Boston. Due to tight schedules on both sides, the only possible date is Friday, November 15, 1996. Frankie has already explored the possibility of performing that same night at Geeper Creepers, a club just down the block from Night Howl. Geeper Creepers is prepared to offer Frankie its standard payment of $5,000 plus $5 for each ticket sold. Frankie’s best guess is that Geeper Creepers will be able to sell 1,000 tickets, bringing his total payment to $10,000. Performance fees aside, Frankie is indifferent between playing at Night Howl and Geeper Creepers. Since Geeper Creepers needs a “yes” or a “no” at the end of the week, Frankie has arranged a meeting with Jane Johnson, booking agent for Night Howl. Johnson has two other alternatives for the night of November 15: Susie Gee, a nationally-renowned folk singer, and The Split Infinitives, a rising alternative band which has just signed a major label recording contract. The Split Infinitives have played a dozen shows at the Night Howl and have sold out each of their last five events. Although they are clearly Johnson’s first choice, The Split Infinitives have an even tighter schedule than Frankie: they will be touring in England in early fall, before beginning a tour on the West Coast. Since their schedule will not be finalized for another two weeks, Johnson will not know of The Split Infinitives’ availability before she needs to decide whether to book Frankie Ferrara. Jane Johnson will however know of The Split Infinitives’ schedule before she must commit to Susie Gee. All told, Johnson believes that there is only a 25% chance that The Split Infinitives will be available for the night of November 15. The economics for each of the artists are described in Table 1. Johnson is almost certain that either Susie Gee or The Split Infinitives would sell out Night Howl’s 1,500 seat venue, as both have in the past. But Johnson will only be able to charge $12 for Susie Gee in contrast to the $22 she can get if she books The Split Infinitives. With Frankie, Johnson would sell tickets for $20. Given his loyal (but limited) following in her mind, she is confident that she will be able to sell 800 tickets for his show. Frankie Ferrara. Johnson has negotiated payments of $11,000 with Susie Gee and $18,000 with The Split Infinitives. The economics of booking either artist are quite favorable for Night Howl. Still, Jane Johnson might very well choose to go with Frankie Ferrara if she can negotiate a good deal with the aging rock star. Questions Assume that all parties are risk neutral expected-value maximizers.

Susie Gee The Split Infinitives Frankie Ferrara Ticket Price $12.00 $22.00 $20.00 1,500 1,500 800 None Little None Expected A

1) What is Frankie’s BATNA? What is Frankie’s reservation price?

2)What is Night Howl’s BATNA? What is Night Howl’s reservation price?

3) Is there a ZOPA? If so, what is it?

4) For this question only, assume that Frankie has an agent who is just starting out in the business. The agent gets 20% of whatever fee he negotiates for Frankie. In addition to his fee, the agent would be able to generate “considerably more” future business for himself if he books Frankie at Night Howl than if he books Frankie at Geeper Creepers. Qualitatively, how does the ZOPA change if Night Howl and Geeper Creepers negotiate only with the agent rather than with Frankie directly? Assume that the agent is interested only in maximizing his own expected value. (10 points)

5) Consider for this question only the following factors. Indicate whether each factor (a) would increase (I), decrease (D), or have no impact (NI) on Frankie’s reservation price; and (b) would increase (I), decrease (D), or have no impact (NI) on Jane Johnson’s reservation price: a) Jane Johnson is risk averse; (5 points) b) Frankie Ferrara is risk averse; (5 points) c) For sentimental reasons, Frankie prefers playing at Geeper Creepers to Night Howl, all else equal. (5 points)

0 0
Add a comment Improve this question Transcribed image text
Request Professional Answer

Request Answer!

We need at least 10 more requests to produce the answer.

0 / 10 have requested this problem solution

The more requests, the faster the answer.

Request! (Login Required)


All students who have requested the answer will be notified once they are available.
Know the answer?
Add Answer to:
Frankie Ferrara Part A Frankie Ferrara is a veteran rock musician. In the late 1970’s, Frankie’s...
Your Answer:

Post as a guest

Your Name:

What's your source?

Earn Coins

Coins can be redeemed for fabulous gifts.

Similar Homework Help Questions
  • Help needed for Project procurement to answer Questions 1-10: Building Trust   Pauly Shore is a junior...

    Help needed for Project procurement to answer Questions 1-10: Building Trust   Pauly Shore is a junior procurement manager for the Goldwell Restaurant Group. He is responsible for the procurement of IT commodities for the data center. After months of negotiating with the three best and lowest-priced bidders for the computer paper contract, Pauly selected Frankie’s Paper Company.  Pauly’s decision was made after a round of golf at Frankie’s country club. On the eighteenth hole, Frankie extended his hand to Pauly and...

  • Consider a town in which only two residents, Bob and Cho, own wells that produce water...

    Consider a town in which only two residents, Bob and Cho, own wells that produce water safe for drinking. Bob and Cho can pump and sell as much water as they want at no cost. For them, total revenue equals profit. The following table shows the town's demand schedule for water. Price Quantity Demanded Total Revenue (Dollars per gallon) (Gallons of water) (Dollars) 6.00 0 0 5.50 45 $247.50 5.00 90 $450.00 4.50 135 $607.50 4.00 180 $720.00 3.50 225...

  • Do No Harm: 4 6. Breakdown of a cartel agreement Consider a town in which only two residents, Brian and Crystal, o...

    Do No Harm: 4 6. Breakdown of a cartel agreement Consider a town in which only two residents, Brian and Crystal, own wells that produce water safe for drinking. Brian and Crystal can pump and sell as much water as they want at no cost. For them, total revenue equals profit. The following table shows the town's demand schedule for water. Quantity Demanded (Gallons of water) Total Revenue (Dollars) Price (Dollars per gallon) 6.00 5.50 5.00 4.50 4.00 248 450...

  • 3. Breakdown of a cartel agreement Consider a town in which only two residents, Sean and Yvette, own wells that produce...

    3. Breakdown of a cartel agreement Consider a town in which only two residents, Sean and Yvette, own wells that produce water safe for drinking. Sean and Yvette can pump and sell as much water as they want at no cost. For them, total revenue equals profit. The following table shows the town's demand schedule for water Quantity Demanded (Gallons of water) Total Revenue (Dollars) Price (Dollars per gallon) 3.60 3.30 3.00 2.70 2.40 2.10 1.80 1.50 1.20 0.90 0.60...

  • 3. Breakdown of a cartel agreement Consider a town in which only two residents, Felix and...

    3. Breakdown of a cartel agreement Consider a town in which only two residents, Felix and Janet, own wells that produce water safe for drinking. Felix and Janet can pump and sell as much water as they want at no cost. For them, total revenue equals profit. The following table shows the town's demand schedule for water. Price (Dollars per gallon) 5.40 Quantity Demanded (Gallons of water) 0 Total Revenue (Dollars) 0 4.95 40 $198.00 4.50 80 4.05 120 3.60...

  • Conslder a town In which only two resldents, Paolo and Sharon, own wells that produce water safe for drinking

    3. Breakdown of a cartel agreement Conslder a town In which only two resldents, Paolo and Sharon, own wells that produce water safe for drinking. Paolo and Sharon can pump and sell as much water as they want at no cost. For them, total revenue equals profit. The following table shows the town's demand schedule for water. Price (Dollars per gallon)Quantity Demanded (Gallons of water)Total Revenue (Dollars)4.80004.4045$198.004.0090$360.003.60135$486.003.20180$576.002.80225$630.002.40270$648.002.00315$630.001.60360$576.001.20405$486.000.80450$360.000.40495$198.0005400Suppose Paolo and Sharon form a cartel and behave as a monopolist. The profit-maximizing price is...

  • 6. Breakdown of a cartel agreement Consider a town in which only two residents, Tim and...

    6. Breakdown of a cartel agreement Consider a town in which only two residents, Tim and Alyssa, own wells that produce water safe for drinking. Tim and Alyssa can pump and sell as much water as they want at no cost. For them, total revenue equals profit. The following table shows the town's demand schedule for water. Price Quantity Demanded Total Revenue (Dollars per gallon) (Gallons of water) (Dollars) 6.00 0 0 5.50 45 248 5.00 90 450 4.50 135...

  • Consider a town in which only two residents, Jacques and Kyoko, own wells that produce water safe...

    Consider a town in which only two residents, Jacques and Kyoko, own wells that produce water safe for drinking. Jacques and Kyoko can pump and sell as much water as they want at no cost. For them, total revenue equals profit. The following table shows the town's demand schedule for water. Price Quantity Demanded Total Revenue (Dollars per litre) Litres of water) (Dollars,) 4.20 3.85 3.50 3.15 2.80 2.45 2.10 1.75 1.40 1.05 0.70 0.35 40 80 120 160 200...

  • 3. Breakdown of a cartel agreement Consider a town in which only two residents, Brian and...

    3. Breakdown of a cartel agreement Consider a town in which only two residents, Brian and Crystal, own wells that produce water safe for drinking, Brian and Crystal can pump and sell as much water as they want at no cost. For them, total revenue equals profit. The following table shows the town's demand schedule for water Price (Dollars per gallon) 3.00 Quantity Demanded (Gallons of water) Total Revenue (Dollars) 2.75 2.50 2.25 2.00 1.75 1.50 1.25 1.00 0.75 0.50...

  • Breakdown of a cartel agreement 3. Breakdown of a cartel agreement Aa Aa E Imagine that...

    Breakdown of a cartel agreement 3. Breakdown of a cartel agreement Aa Aa E Imagine that there is a town in which only two of the residents, Stelios and Sondra, own wells that produce water safe for drinking, and imagine that Stelios and Sondra can pump and sell as much water as they want at no cost. For them, total revenue equals profit. The following table shows the town's demand schedule for water. Price per Litre ($) Litres Demanded 6....

ADVERTISEMENT
Free Homework Help App
Download From Google Play
Scan Your Homework
to Get Instant Free Answers
Need Online Homework Help?
Ask a Question
Get Answers For Free
Most questions answered within 3 hours.
ADVERTISEMENT
ADVERTISEMENT
ADVERTISEMENT