When they form a cartel and behave as a monopolist,they will set price and quantity where the revenue is maximum, so the profit-maximizing price is 2.10 and the total output is 240.As part of their agreement,the production is split equally so Jacques profit is 504/2 = 252 and Kyoko profit is 504/2 = 252
When Jacques implements his new plan and increases his production by 40 more litres then price decreases to 1.75 so Jacques profit becomes 240/2+40 = 160*1.75 = 280 and Kyoko profit becomes 120*1.75 = 210
When Kyoko increases her production by 40 litres,then the price will further decrease to 1.40 so Jacques profit becomes 320/2= 160*1.40 = 224 and Kyoko profit becomes 160*1.40 =224 so total profit is now 224+224 = 448
You know that the output effect is larger than the price effect - True
This outcome is an example of a Nash Equilibrium
Consider a town in which only two residents, Jacques and Kyoko, own wells that produce water safe...
3. Breakdown of a cartel agreement Consider a town in which only two residents, Sean and Yvette, own wells that produce water safe for drinking. Sean and Yvette can pump and sell as much water as they want at no cost. For them, total revenue equals profit. The following table shows the town's demand schedule for water Quantity Demanded (Gallons of water) Total Revenue (Dollars) Price (Dollars per gallon) 3.60 3.30 3.00 2.70 2.40 2.10 1.80 1.50 1.20 0.90 0.60...
Consider a town in which only two residents, Bob and Cho, own wells that produce water safe for drinking. Bob and Cho can pump and sell as much water as they want at no cost. For them, total revenue equals profit. The following table shows the town's demand schedule for water. Price Quantity Demanded Total Revenue (Dollars per gallon) (Gallons of water) (Dollars) 6.00 0 0 5.50 45 $247.50 5.00 90 $450.00 4.50 135 $607.50 4.00 180 $720.00 3.50 225...
3. Breakdown of a cartel agreement Conslder a town In which only two resldents, Paolo and Sharon, own wells that produce water safe for drinking. Paolo and Sharon can pump and sell as much water as they want at no cost. For them, total revenue equals profit. The following table shows the town's demand schedule for water. Price (Dollars per gallon)Quantity Demanded (Gallons of water)Total Revenue (Dollars)4.80004.4045$198.004.0090$360.003.60135$486.003.20180$576.002.80225$630.002.40270$648.002.00315$630.001.60360$576.001.20405$486.000.80450$360.000.40495$198.0005400Suppose Paolo and Sharon form a cartel and behave as a monopolist. The profit-maximizing price is...
2. Breakdown of a cartel agreement Consider a town in which only two residents, Manuel and Poornima, own wells that produce water safe for drinking. Manuel and Poornima can pump and sell as much water as they want at no cost. For them, total revenue equals profit. The following table shows the town's demand schedule for water. Total Revenue Price Quantity Demanded (Dollars per gallon) (Gallons of water) (Dollars) 3.60 0 3.30 35 $115.50 3.00 70 $210.00 105 $283.50 2.70...
6. Breakdown of a cartel agreement Consider a town in which only two residents, Tim and Alyssa, own wells that produce water safe for drinking. Tim and Alyssa can pump and sell as much water as they want at no cost. For them, total revenue equals profit. The following table shows the town's demand schedule for water. Price Quantity Demanded Total Revenue (Dollars per gallon) (Gallons of water) (Dollars) 6.00 0 0 5.50 45 248 5.00 90 450 4.50 135...
3. Breakdown of a cartel agreement Consider a town in which only two residents, Felix and Janet, own wells that produce water safe for drinking. Felix and Janet can pump and sell as much water as they want at no cost. For them, total revenue equals profit. The following table shows the town's demand schedule for water. Price (Dollars per gallon) 5.40 Quantity Demanded (Gallons of water) 0 Total Revenue (Dollars) 0 4.95 40 $198.00 4.50 80 4.05 120 3.60...
3. Breakdown of a cartel agreement Consider a town in which only two residents, Brian and Crystal, own wells that produce water safe for drinking, Brian and Crystal can pump and sell as much water as they want at no cost. For them, total revenue equals profit. The following table shows the town's demand schedule for water Price (Dollars per gallon) 3.00 Quantity Demanded (Gallons of water) Total Revenue (Dollars) 2.75 2.50 2.25 2.00 1.75 1.50 1.25 1.00 0.75 0.50...
Do No Harm: 4 6. Breakdown of a cartel agreement Consider a town in which only two residents, Brian and Crystal, own wells that produce water safe for drinking. Brian and Crystal can pump and sell as much water as they want at no cost. For them, total revenue equals profit. The following table shows the town's demand schedule for water. Quantity Demanded (Gallons of water) Total Revenue (Dollars) Price (Dollars per gallon) 6.00 5.50 5.00 4.50 4.00 248 450...
Breakdown of a cartel agreement 3. Breakdown of a cartel agreement Aa Aa E Imagine that there is a town in which only two of the residents, Stelios and Sondra, own wells that produce water safe for drinking, and imagine that Stelios and Sondra can pump and sell as much water as they want at no cost. For them, total revenue equals profit. The following table shows the town's demand schedule for water. Price per Litre ($) Litres Demanded 6....
These two questions please Imagine a small town in which only two residents, Matthew and Anna, own wells that produce water for safe drinking. Each Saturday, Matthew and Anna work together to decide how many litres of water to pump, bring the water to town, and sell it at whatever price the market will bear. To keep things simple, suppose that Matthew and Anna can pump as much water as they want without cost; therefore, the marginal cost of water...