Answer :
As I drop down the answers in the blanks with respectively numbers.
(1) :- Profit maximizing price = 2.70 because total revenue or profit is highest at this price.
240 gallons
Total profit = $ 648
So, each firm's profit = 648/2 = $ 324
Felix's profit = $ 324
Janet's profit = $ 324
When production increases by 40 units then the price of water decreases to $ 2.25 per gallon.
• Suppose Felix and Janet form a cartel and behave as a monopolist. The profit-maximizing price is $2.70 per gallon, and the total output is 240 gallons. As part of their cartel agreement, Felix and Janet agree to split production equally. Therefore, Felix's profit is $324 and Janet's profit is $324.
(2) :- When production increases by 40 units then the price of water decreases to $2.25 per gallon.
Felix's new profit = (240/2 + 40units) X $ 2.25 = $ 360
Janet's new profit = (240/2) X $ 2.25 = $ 270
• After Felix implements his new plan, the price of water DECREASES to $1.80 per gallon. Given Janet and Felix's production levels, Felix's profit becomes $360 and Janet's profit becomes $270.
(3) :- When Janet also increases production by 40 units then price of water again decreases and reaches at $ 1.80 per gallon.
Felix's profit = 320/2 X 1.80 = $288
Janet's profit = 320/2 X 1.80 = $288
Total profit = $288 + $288 = $576
After Janet increases her production, Felix's profit becomes $288 Janet's profit becomes $288 and total profit (the sum of the profits of Felix and Janet) is now $576.
(4) :- True or False: Based on the fact that both Felix and Janet increased production from the initial cartel quantity, you know that the output effect was larger than the price effect at that quantity.
The given statement is False.
(5) :- Note that Felix and Janet started by behaving cooperatively. However, once Felix decided to cheat, Janet decided to cheat as well. In other words, Janet's output decisions are based on Felix's actions.
This behavior is an example of TIT FOR TAT STRATEGY
Explanation :
Tit for Tat strategy means both player cooperate at the first play; then, on subsequent plays, do the same action the other player choose on the immediately previous play.
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