Question

1.) Explain the "Euthyphro Problem" making sure to talk about the dilemma Socrates points to and the problems associated with each of the two ways of interpreting a god's relation to acts that we ought to perform (i.e., "pious" acts) or ought not to perform (i.e., "impious" acts).

Answer 1

Euthyphro problem can be summarized in light of the dilemma Socrates points to and the problems associated with each of the two ways of interpreting God's relation to acts we ought to perform, the pious acts, and the acts we ought not to perform, the impious acts. Euthyphro dilemma: God gives us morality, tells us what is right, the pious acts, and wrong, the impious acts. The dilemma is formulated as ‘does God say to do pious acts we ought to perform because they are good’ or ‘are the pious acts good because God says they are good.’ In other words ‘is God reading out of a manual and telling us what is good’ or ‘is God writing a manual as he goes and whatever he says becomes good’. Being a dilemma one needs to stick on to either one, but neither seems to be too appealing.

On the first horn of the dilemma, God says things because they are good. Basically there is some other reason outside of God. Basically there is some other reason outside of God because of which acts are pious. God doesn’t define the rules; he just really reads them to us. God cannot really do everything; he is somehow constrained by the rules of morality, which are out of his control because he didn’t create them. God is not required for morality; morality would exist even if God didn’t exist. Morality would continue even if God stopped existing. Morality is something, which was not created by God. Basically, if the rules of morality dictated that God must act a certain way, he is powerless to disobey. Thus it seems that under this horn God's omnipotence is limited and he seems unnecessary for our daily lives because morality does exist outside of him. God is not the creator of morality or pious acts but a transcriber of morality.

The second horn of the dilemma has the opposite problem. Here acts are good because God says so. This makes morality arbitrary. If God started making everyone suffer, that wouldn't be good. God can't be judged as good because he couldn't be otherwise. This omnibenevolence seems inconsequential because he is the definition of good. If God stopped existing, there wouldn't be any morality. If God never existed good and bad would have just been in our thoughts and would have been a fabrication. God can make anything, even a crime, good if he told someone to do so. Here, God's omnibenevolence seems compromised. God can make anything good. No deeper reason is needed to make an act good.