The first-mover advantage may be observed in:
a. |
A simultaneous move game |
|
b. |
Both sequential and simultaneous-move games |
|
c. |
A sequential game |
A. Simultaneous move game
A first mover is a company which gets a competitive advantages to being 1st who bring or introduce the new product or service to the market.they can establish a strong brand name amazon, Ola these are the example there i a drawback that someone can also copy the idea or content. This can be riski
The first-mover advantage may be observed in: a. A simultaneous move game b. Both sequential and...
1. in some sequential move games there is a first-mover advantage; in others there is a second-mover advantage. True False 2. The experimental evidence on the ultimatum game shows that players will sometimes reject offers that give them a positive share of the pie. This behavior is consistent with rational behavior. True False
In a simultaneous move game, both players make their strategy choices at the same time. In a sequential move game, one player chooses his strategy first, and then seeing the move that the first player made, the second player chooses her strategy. Hence, in sequential game player is better informed and will act accordingly, than in simultaneous move game where he faces risk between different strategies.
Suppose it is possible for LD to be a first-mover in this game. The sequential game tree looks as follows, where payoffs for LD are listed to the left of the comma and payoffs for HC are listed to the right of the comma: (Profit Profit.c) THC (75, 150) DIY DIY WDI (150, 400) LD WDI DIY (300, 120) HC WDI (50, 50) What is the Nash Equilibrium of this sequential game?
Provide an example of a situation where moving first in a sequential move game is a disadvantage rather than an advantage. Why is this the case?
Some Game Theory Problems 3. Find all of the pure strategy Nash Equilibria of the following simultaneous move game. After solving it as a simultaneous move game, write it as a sequential move game with column moving first. Drow the game tree and solve for the Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium. Column 9,4 1,10 15,7 15,5 14,8 3,10 12,18 20,12 Row C 7,8 6,8 20,10 3,3 15,9 15,0 14,2 9,1 20,18 2,9 10,14 19,20
2. Consider the following simultaneous move game: Column Left Right Top 1,1 7,3 Row Bottom 3,5 11,0 (a) Find all pure-strategy Nash equilibria (b) Now assume that the game is made sequential with Row moving first. Illustrate this new game using a game tree and find the rollback equilibrium (c) List the strategies of the two players in this sequential-move game and give the normal-form representation of the game (the payoff matrix) (d) Use the payoff matrix to find the...
2. Consider the following simultaneous move game: Column Left Right 1,1 3,5 11,0 Тoр 7,3 Row Bottom (a) Find all pure-strategy Nash equilibria (b) Now assume that the game is made sequential with Row moving first. Illustrate this new game using a game tree and find the rollback equilibrium (c) List the strategies of the two players in this sequential-move game and give the normal-form representation of the game (the payoff matrix) (d) Use the payoff matrix to find the...
2. Consider the following simultaneous move game Column Left Right 1.1 7,3 3.5 Тор Row Bottom 11.0 (a) Find all pure-strategy Nash equilibria. (b) Now assume that the game is made sequential with Row moving first. Illustrate this new game using a game tree and find the rollback equilibrium. (c) List the strategies of the two players in this sequential-move game and give the normal-form representation of the game (the payoff matrix) (d) Use the payoff matrix to find the...
3. Iqsi#2ere a first or second mover advantage? Why or why not? 4. Suppose that the game in question #2 was played simultaneously. What are the equilibria, if any? 5. Find the equilibrium of the following simultaneous game. Player 2 Left Right 2,5 2,2 Player 1 Up 10,10 Down 5,2 6. If the game in #5 is sequential what is the equilibrium? 7. What does Common Knowledge of the game mean and why is it important? 8. Consider the following...
In order to calculate the probable outcome of a sequential-move strategy game, the basic approach is to: a. reason ahead while looking back. b. play it like a simultaneous-move game. c. look ahead while reasoning back. d. look ahead and reason ahead.