Question

The category "species" is both arbitrary AND accidental. Why then, according to Singer, does it fail to morally justify our treatment of species that are not human?

Answer 1

In Animal Liberation, Singer argues that in assessing the consequences of our actions, it is necessary to take the interests of animals seriously and to weigh any adverse effect on those interests from human actions as part of the consequences of those actions. Humans have failed to do this, Singer argues, because of a species bias, or speciesism, that results in a systematic devaluation of animal interests. Singer claims that speciesism is no more morally defensible than racism, sexism, or other forms of discrimination that arbitrarily exclude humans from the scope of moral concern. When people seek to justify the horrific ways animals are treated, they invariably point to supposed animal "defects," such as the inability of animals to use human language or to reason as intricately as do humans. But there are severely retarded humans who cannot speak or reason (or, at least, can do so no better than many nonhumans), and most of us would be appalled if those humans were used in experiments, or for food or clothing. Singer maintains that the only way to justify our present level of animal exploitation is to maintain that species differences alone justify that exploitation. But that is no different, Singer argues, from saying that differences in race or sex alone justify the differential treatment of otherwise similarly situated persons.

Singer's approach is clearly more favourable toward animals than classical animal welfare, which accorded little weight to animal interests. It is important, however, to understand that Singer's theory is not a theory of animal rights. For Singer, the rightness or wrongness of conduct is determined by consequences, and not by any appeal to the right. If violating a right holder's right in a particular case will produce more desirable consequences than respecting that right, then Singer is committed to violating the right.

For example, Singer opposes most animal experimentation, only because he thinks that most animal experiments produce benefits that are insufficient to justify the animal suffering that results. But he does not and cannot oppose all animal experimentation because if a particular animal use would, for example, lead directly to a cure for a disease that affected many humans, Singer would be committed to approving that animal use. Indeed, Singer has acknowledged that under some circumstances, it would be permissible to use nonconsenting humans in experiments if the benefits for all affected outweighed the detriment to the humans used in the experiment.