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1 point Which one of the following descriptions is wrong according to this extensive form? *...
1 point Which one of the following descriptions is correct according to this extensive form? *...
1 point Which one of the following descriptions is correct according to this extensive form? * R 0,0 – 1,1 1,-1 1,-1 0,0 - 1,1 - 1,1 > 1,-1 Ś 0,0 O There are 4 players. Player 2's strategy space is different from Player 1's There are 9 possible strategy profiles. O When Player 2 is going to make her decision, she knows exactly what decision Player 1 makes.
Game: Extensive Form. Suppose player 1 chooses G or H, and player 2 observes this choice....
Game: Extensive Form. Suppose player 1 chooses G or H, and player 2 observes this choice. If player 1 chooses H, then player 2 must choose A or B. Player 1 does not get to observe this choice by player 2, and must then choose X or Y. If A and X are played, the payoff for player 1 is 1 and for player 2 it's 5. If A and Y are played, the payoff for player 1 is 6...
In the extensive form representation of the game between Player 1 and Player 2, Player 1...
In the extensive form representation of the game between Player 1 and Player 2, Player 1 moves first and chooses L or R. If Player 1 chooses R the game ends, if Player 1 chooses L then Player 1 and 2 play a simultaneous move game. The game has______________ pure strategy Nash equilibria and__________ pure strategy Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibria (SPNE). The maximum payoff Player 2 gets in a SPNE is___________ . (Please, enter only numerical answers like: 1, 2,...
Solve the following Extensive Form game by Backward Induction, then covert them into Normal Form and...
Solve the following Extensive Form game by Backward Induction,
then covert them into Normal Form and find the pure-strategy Nash
equilibria in Normal Form.
P1 V P2 (2, 2) P1 (1,3) B (3,4) (4,2)
5. (General Extensive Form Game IID Suppose the following general extensive-form game. Note that denotes the...
5. (General Extensive Form Game IID Suppose the following general extensive-form game. Note that denotes the belief that the player 2's decision node after Player 1 chooses Ais reached. Player 1 (2, 2) Player 2 a, 0) (3, 1 (a) Find the conditions on parameter values (a and b) such that (B,X) witlh 0 is the perfect Bayesian equilibrium, if any (b) Find the conditions on parameter values (a and b) such that (C,Y) is the strategy profile of the...
Consider the following extensive-form game with two players, 1 and 2. a). Find the pure-strategy Nash...
Consider the following extensive-form game with two players, 1
and 2.
a). Find the pure-strategy Nash equilibria of the game. [8
Marks]
b). Find the pure-strategy subgame-perfect equilibria of the
game. [6 Marks]
c). Derive the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium of the subgame.
If players play this mixed Nash equilibrium in the subgame, would 1
player In or Out at the initial mode? [6 Marks]
[Hint: Write down the normal-form of the subgame and derive the
mixed Nash equilibrium of...
10 points Save Answer (3,2) (0,0) (24) ,4) (0,o) In the extensive form representation of the...
10 points Save Answer (3,2) (0,0) (24) ,4) (0,o) In the extensive form representation of the game between Player 1 and Player 2, Player 1 moves first and chooses L or R. Player 1 chooses R the game ends, if Player 1 chooses L then Player 1 and 2 play a simultaneous move game. The game has maximum payolf Player 2 gets in a SPNE is pure strategy Nash equlibria and pure strategy Subgame Perfect Nash Equilbria (SPNE). The ....
3.2) (0,0) (24) 6,4) (0,) In the extensive form representation of the game between Player 1...
3.2) (0,0) (24) 6,4) (0,) In the extensive form representation of the game between Player 1 and Flayer 2 Player 1 moves first and chooses L or R. If Player 1 chooses R the game ends, if Player 1 chooses L then Player 1 and 2 play a simultaneous move game. The game has pure strategy Nash equibra and pure strategy Subgame Pertect Nash Equnbia (SPNE). The maximum payott Flayer 2 gete in a SHNE IS Please, enter oniy numencal...
Consider the extensive form game above. The game has _______ proper subgames. The strategy profile (AGJKM,...
Consider the extensive form game above. The game has _______
proper subgames. The strategy profile (AGJKM, CF) leads to a payoff
of _______ for Player 1 and _________ for Player 2. In the backward
induction equilibrium in pure strategies. Player 2 gets a payoff of
____________ (Please, enter only numerical values like: 0, 1, 2,
3,....).
2 36 8 LM 2 2 2 4 2 5
Question 1 o, 0 0 21 2 0 0 Consider the extensive form game portrayed above....
Question 1 o, 0 0 21 2 0 0 Consider the extensive form game portrayed above. The top number at a terminal node is player 1's payoff, the middle number is player 2's payoff and the bottom number is player 3's payof. a. Derive the strategy set for each player. (Note: If you do not want to list all of the strategies, you can provide a general description of a player's strategy, give an example, and state how many strategies...
1 point Which one of the following descriptions is correct according to this extensive form? * R 0,0 – 1,1 1,-1 1,-1 0,0 - 1,1 - 1,1 > 1,-1 Ś 0,0 O There are 4 players. Player 2's strategy space is different from Player 1's There are 9 possible strategy profiles. O When Player 2 is going to make her decision, she knows exactly what decision Player 1 makes.
Solve the following Extensive Form game by Backward Induction,
then covert them into Normal Form and find the pure-strategy Nash
equilibria in Normal Form.
P1 V P2 (2, 2) P1 (1,3) B (3,4) (4,2)
5. (General Extensive Form Game IID Suppose the following general extensive-form game. Note that denotes the belief that the player 2's decision node after Player 1 chooses Ais reached. Player 1 (2, 2) Player 2 a, 0) (3, 1 (a) Find the conditions on parameter values (a and b) such that (B,X) witlh 0 is the perfect Bayesian equilibrium, if any (b) Find the conditions on parameter values (a and b) such that (C,Y) is the strategy profile of the...
Consider the following extensive-form game with two players, 1
and 2.
a). Find the pure-strategy Nash equilibria of the game. [8
Marks]
b). Find the pure-strategy subgame-perfect equilibria of the
game. [6 Marks]
c). Derive the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium of the subgame.
If players play this mixed Nash equilibrium in the subgame, would 1
player In or Out at the initial mode? [6 Marks]
[Hint: Write down the normal-form of the subgame and derive the
mixed Nash equilibrium of...
10 points Save Answer (3,2) (0,0) (24) ,4) (0,o) In the extensive form representation of the game between Player 1 and Player 2, Player 1 moves first and chooses L or R. Player 1 chooses R the game ends, if Player 1 chooses L then Player 1 and 2 play a simultaneous move game. The game has maximum payolf Player 2 gets in a SPNE is pure strategy Nash equlibria and pure strategy Subgame Perfect Nash Equilbria (SPNE). The ....
3.2) (0,0) (24) 6,4) (0,) In the extensive form representation of the game between Player 1 and Flayer 2 Player 1 moves first and chooses L or R. If Player 1 chooses R the game ends, if Player 1 chooses L then Player 1 and 2 play a simultaneous move game. The game has pure strategy Nash equibra and pure strategy Subgame Pertect Nash Equnbia (SPNE). The maximum payott Flayer 2 gete in a SHNE IS Please, enter oniy numencal...
Consider the extensive form game above. The game has _______
proper subgames. The strategy profile (AGJKM, CF) leads to a payoff
of _______ for Player 1 and _________ for Player 2. In the backward
induction equilibrium in pure strategies. Player 2 gets a payoff of
____________ (Please, enter only numerical values like: 0, 1, 2,
3,....).
2 36 8 LM 2 2 2 4 2 5
Question 1 o, 0 0 21 2 0 0 Consider the extensive form game portrayed above. The top number at a terminal node is player 1's payoff, the middle number is player 2's payoff and the bottom number is player 3's payof. a. Derive the strategy set for each player. (Note: If you do not want to list all of the strategies, you can provide a general description of a player's strategy, give an example, and state how many strategies...
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