Consider two Stackelberg firms, Firm Alpha and Firm Omega, each with marginal costs of 50 and each facing the market inverse demand curve: P=500-1/2Q Firm Alpha moves first, Firm Omega moves second. How many MORE units does Firm Alpha produce than Firm Omega due to first mover advantage?
Consider two Stackelberg firms, Firm Alpha and Firm Omega, each with marginal costs of 50 and...
4. Consider 2 firms selling fertilizer competing as Cournot duopolists. The inverse demand function facing the fertilizer market is P = 1 - where Q = 94 +98. For simplicity, assume that the long-run marginal cost for each firm is equal to X, i.e. C(q)=Xq for each firm. a) Find the Cournot Nash equilibrium where the firms choose output simultaneously b) Find the Stackelberg Nash Equilibrium where firm A as the Stackelberg leader. How much does the leader gain by...
Consider two Cournot firms, Firm A and Firm B. Firm A has a marginal cost of 10 and Firm B has a marginal cost of 5. They face the market inverse demand function: P=120-Q How many units will Firm A produce?
1. Suppose there are only two firms in the marker, firm A and firm B. They produce identical products. Firm A and firm B have the same constant marginal cost, MCA MCB ACA ACB 25 The market demand function is given by 0-400 4P. e. Calculate the profits for each firm in the Cournot model. f. g. Is the monopoly outcome stable? If firm A operates under the monopoly outcome, h. Graph the monopoly outcome, cournot outcome and perfect competition...
3. Two firms that are engaged in Stackelberg competition face the market inverse demand curve P-100-2Q, where Q is the total 22-0.Sqy, what is Firm 1's (the first-mover's) nverse demand une output, q2. Each firm produces the product at a constant marginal cost of $22. If Firm 2's reaction function is P 56-4 OP=100-2(92-22 + 0.050;) OP=88-1.541 P 88-24
6. (6 pts) In a Stackelberg model of quantity competition, firm 1 moves first by commiting to a level of output, and firm 2 moves second after observing firm 1's choice. The market inverse demand curve is given by: P = 110-Q and the firms' cost structures are given by: CQ) K10Q where Kis a fixed cost of production (a Suppos A = 0. Find the quantities and profits for each firm in the subgame perfect Nash equiibru. (4 pts)...
Consider a Cournot competition with two firms, A and B. The marginal costs of each firm is MCA = MCB = 40. The inverse demand function is P = 130 - Q. Find the Nash equilibrium quantities for each firm and the market price.
2) As in the above exercise 1), consider two firms with the same constant average and marginal cost AC=MC =5 facing the market demand curve Q1 + Q2 53- P. Now, let's consider the Stackelberg model in order to analyze what will happen when one of the firms makes its output decision ahead of the other firm Suppose that firm 1 is the Stackelberg leader. How much will each firm produce? What is the resulting market price? How much profit...
Consider two identical Cournot firms that each have a marginal cost of 20, facing the market inverse demand function: P=120-Q What is the quantity produced for each firm? Round your answer to the nearest 1 decimal places.
Suppose that each firm in a competitive industry has the following costs: Total Cost: TC= 50+1/2 q^2 Marginal Cost: MC= q where qq is an individual firm's quantity produced. The market demand curve for this product is Demand QD=160−4PQD=160−4P where PP is the price and QQ is the total quantity of the good. Each firm's fixed cost is $_____ What is each firm's variable cost? q 50+1/2 q 1/2q 1/2q^2 Which of the following represents the equation for each firm's...
Two identical firms face a linear demand curve (written as inverse demand of P = 50 -0.50, The marginal cost for each firm is MC = 0. Assume that both firms compete as Cournot dupolists. Find the equilibrium output for each firm and the market price. o Select one: a. Each firm will produce 66.67 units, and the market price is $33.33 b. Each firm will produce 25 units, and the market price is $25 c. Each firm will produce...