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Two hunters must choose simultaneously between hunting a stag or hunting hares. If a hunter hunts...
1. Two hunters set out to kill a stag. One has agreed to drive the stag...
1. Two hunters set out to kill a stag. One has agreed to drive the stag through the forest, and the other to post at a place where the stag must pass. If both faithfully perform their assigned stag-hunting tasks, they will surely kill the stag and each will get an equal share of this large animal. During the course of the hunt, each hunter has an opportunity to abandon the stag hunt and pursue a hare. If a hunter...
Exercise 1. Two individuals go out on a hunt. Each can individually choose to hunt a...
Exercise 1. Two individuals go out on a hunt. Each can individually choose to hunt a stag or hunt a hare. Each hunter must choose an action without knowing the choice of the other. The only way of hunting a stag is that both hunters choose to hunt it. An individual can always get a hare by himself, but a hare is worth less than a stag. To be precise, each hunter will get a payoff equal to two for...
3. Consider the following stag hunt game. Two hungry hunters go to the woods with the...
3. Consider the following stag hunt game. Two hungry hunters go to the woods with the aim of catching a stag, or at least a hare. They can catch a stag only if both remain alert and devote their time and energy to catching it. Catching a hare is less demanding and does not require the cooperation of the other hunter. Each hunter prefers half a stag to a hare. Letting S denote the action of going after the stag,...
3. Consider the following game. Two players can choose either to hunt a stag, or to...
3. Consider the following game. Two players can choose either to hunt a stag, or to hunt a hare. If a player hunts a stag, then they must have the other player’s cooperation in order to succeed. A player can hunt a hare by themself, but a hare is worth less than a stag. The following payoff matrix depicts this situation. What is the Nash equilibrium? Show your work. (10%
Asterix and Obelix go hunting. They can either choose to hunt a boar or hunt a...
Asterix and Obelix go hunting. They can either choose to hunt a boar or hunt a rabbit. Each one chooses their action (to hunt boar or rabbit), without observing the action chosen by the other. If either Asterix or Obelix hunts a boar, they must have the cooperation of their partner in order to succeed. Either Asterix or Obelix can hunt the rabbit by themselves, (i.e., alone, without cooperation from the partner), but a rabbit is worth less than a...
Problem 5. (20 points) There are two competing firms. Each firm decides when to exit the...
Problem 5. (20 points) There are two competing firms. Each firm decides when to exit the market: (i) immediately, (ii) after 6 months, or (iii) after 1 year. If a firm decides to exit the market, it does not get any payoff from that point on (that is, its utility stays the same). After every 6 months firms gain or lose utilities as follow: if both firms are still in the market, they both lose -1 and if only one...
Consider the following workplace scenario for the next two questions. Kris and Jane are two work...
Consider the following workplace scenario for the next two questions. Kris and Jane are two work colleagues who simultaneously choose between working Hard and being Lazy. If they both work Hard each player gets 0. If both are Lazy each party again get zero. If Kris works Hard and Jane is Lazy Kris gets 3 and Jane gets a payoff of 6. If Kris is Lazy and Jane works Hard the payoffs are 5 and 5 to Kris and Jane...
Consider the following workplace scenario for the next two questions. Kris and Jane are two work...
Consider the following workplace scenario for the next two questions. Kris and Jane are two work colleagues who simultaneously choose between working Hard and being Lazy. If they both work Hard each player gets 0. If both are Lazy each party again get zero. If Kris works Hard and Jane is Lazy Kris gets 3 and Jane gets a payoff of 6. If Kris is Lazy and Jane works Hard the payoffs are 5 and 5 to Kris and Jane...
1. Two hunters set out to kill a stag. One has agreed to drive the stag through the forest, and the other to post at a place where the stag must pass. If both faithfully perform their assigned stag-hunting tasks, they will surely kill the stag and each will get an equal share of this large animal. During the course of the hunt, each hunter has an opportunity to abandon the stag hunt and pursue a hare. If a hunter...
Exercise 1. Two individuals go out on a hunt. Each can individually choose to hunt a stag or hunt a hare. Each hunter must choose an action without knowing the choice of the other. The only way of hunting a stag is that both hunters choose to hunt it. An individual can always get a hare by himself, but a hare is worth less than a stag. To be precise, each hunter will get a payoff equal to two for...
3. Consider the following stag hunt game. Two hungry hunters go to the woods with the aim of catching a stag, or at least a hare. They can catch a stag only if both remain alert and devote their time and energy to catching it. Catching a hare is less demanding and does not require the cooperation of the other hunter. Each hunter prefers half a stag to a hare. Letting S denote the action of going after the stag,...
Problem 5. (20 points) There are two competing firms. Each firm decides when to exit the market: (i) immediately, (ii) after 6 months, or (iii) after 1 year. If a firm decides to exit the market, it does not get any payoff from that point on (that is, its utility stays the same). After every 6 months firms gain or lose utilities as follow: if both firms are still in the market, they both lose -1 and if only one...
Consider the following workplace scenario for the next two questions. Kris and Jane are two work colleagues who simultaneously choose between working Hard and being Lazy. If they both work Hard each player gets 0. If both are Lazy each party again get zero. If Kris works Hard and Jane is Lazy Kris gets 3 and Jane gets a payoff of 6. If Kris is Lazy and Jane works Hard the payoffs are 5 and 5 to Kris and Jane...
Consider the following workplace scenario for the next two questions. Kris and Jane are two work colleagues who simultaneously choose between working Hard and being Lazy. If they both work Hard each player gets 0. If both are Lazy each party again get zero. If Kris works Hard and Jane is Lazy Kris gets 3 and Jane gets a payoff of 6. If Kris is Lazy and Jane works Hard the payoffs are 5 and 5 to Kris and Jane...
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