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3. Consider the following game. Two players can choose either to hunt a stag, or to...

3. Consider the following game. Two players can choose either to hunt a stag, or to hunt a hare. If a player hunts a stag, then they must have the other player’s cooperation in order to succeed. A player can hunt a hare by themself, but a hare is worth less than a stag. The following payoff matrix depicts this situation. What is the Nash equilibrium? Show your work. (10%

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Answer #1

Under the stag hunting game, cooperating is Pareto optimal course of action. Both players can maximize their profits by cooperating. Their profits will not rise if they defect. Hence, there are no incentives to defect from cooperation.

Thus, there will be Two Nash Equilibrium:

( Hunt Stag: Hunt Stag) , and ( Hunt Hare: Hunt Hare)

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