Question

Exercise 1. Two individuals go out on a hunt. Each can individually choose to hunt a stag or hunt a hare. Each hunter must choose an action without knowing the choice of the other. The only way of hunting a stag is that both hunters choose to hunt it. An individual can always get a hare by himself, but a hare is worth less than a stag. To be precise, each hunter will get a payoff equal to two for successfully hunting a stag. A hunter will get a payoff equal to one for hunting a hare. Finally, a hunter will get a payoff equal to zero if she does not hunt anything. (i) Identify the set of pure strategies for each player. (ii) Write down the normal form game. (iii) Compute the set of pure strategy Nash equilibria.

Answer 1

o. (i) set of for player, siH3 (i) set for each player of pure strategies si {S,H3 Sundarity for player 2 1 S2 = {5,H 3 (1) Normal form of this spray . 5/2,2 oil Players H110 L game player (i) Nash set of pure strategy eq uebbrua is {stag, stags and {hare , hare]