Q5) Since the two providers can collude, they will collude on a price that gives the maximum revenue.
revenue = price*quantitiy
Revenue at P = 40 is 40*12000 = 480000
Revenue at P = 60 is 60*9000 = 540000
Revenue at P = 80 is 80*6000 = 480000
Revenue at P = 100 is 100*3000 = 300000
Thus, the revenue is amximized when P = 60 and in Nas equilibrium both the providers will collude th a pirce of 60.
Answer = $60 (b)
5. Refer to Table 16-1. Assume that there are two profit-maximizing digital cable TV companies operating...
4. Refer to Table 16-1. Assume that there are two profit-maximizing digital cable TV companies operating in this market. Further assume that they are not able to "collude" on price and quantity of premium digital channel subscriptions to sell. How many premium digital channel cable TV subscriptions will be collectively sold (by both firms) when this market reaches a Nash equilibrium? 3.000 1.56,000 0.19.000 d. 12,000 5. Refer to Table 16-1. Assume that there are two profit-maximizing digital cable TV...
4. Refer to Table 16-1. Assume that there are two profit-maximizing digital cable TV companies operating in this market. Further assume that they are not able to "collude" on price and quantity of premium digital channel subscriptions to sell. How many premium digital channel cable TV subscriptions will be collectively sold (by both firms) when this market reaches a Nash equilibrium? a. 3,000 b. 6,000 c. 9,000 d 12,000 Table 16-1 Quantity 0 3,000 6,000 9,000 12,000 15,000 18,000 Price...
- - 3. Refer to Table 16-1. Assume that there are two profit-maximizing digital cable TV companies operating in this market. Further assume that they are able to "collude" on price and quantity of premium digital channel subscriptions to sell. As part of their collusive agreement they decide to take an equal share of the market. How much profit will each company make? a. $170,000 b. $40,000 c. $480,000 d. $540,000 Table 16-1 Quantity 3,000 6,000 9,000 12,000 15,000 18,000...
2. Refer to Table 16-1. Assume that there are two digital cable TV companies operating in this market. If they are able to collude" on price and quantity of subscriptions to sell, what price (P) will they charge, and how many subscriptions (0) will they collectively sell? a. P - $40, Q = 12,000 b. P=$60, Q -9,000 c. P-$80,- 6,000 d. P - $100, Q -3,000 Table 16-1 Quantity 3,000 6,000 9,000 12.000 15,000 18,000 Price (per year) $120...
Table 16-3 The information in the table below shows the total demand for premium-channel digital cable TV subscriptions in a small urban market. Assume that each digital cable TV operator pays a fixed cost of $100,000 (per year) to provide premium digital channels in the market area and that the marginal cost of providing the premium channel service to a household is zero. Quantity 0 3,000 6,000 9,000 12,000 15,000 18,000 Price (per year) $120 $100 $80 $60 $40 $20...
Use the information below to answer the following questions. The information in the table below depicts the total demand for premium channel digital cable TV subscriptions in a small urban market. Assume that each digital cable TV operator pays a fixed cost of $100,000 (per year) to provide premium digital channels in the market area and that the marginal cost of providing the premium channel service to a household is zero. Table 16-1 Quantity 0 3,000 6,000 9,000 12,000 15,000...
The information in the table below depicts the total demand for premium channel digital cable TV subscriptions in a small urban market. Assume that each digital cable TV operator pays a fixed cost of $100,000 (per year) to provide premium digital channels in the market area and that the marginal cost of providing the premium channel service to a household is zero. Table 16-1 Price (per year) $120 3,000 $100 6,000 $ 80 9,000 12,000 $ 40 15,000 $ 20...
la IP will they charge, and how many subscriptions (Q) will they collectively sell? $40, Q - 12,000 b. P= $60, Q = 9,000 C. P = $80, Q = 6,000 d.p=$100, Q = 3,000 3. Refer to Table 16-1. Assume that there are two profit-maximizing digital cable TV companies operating in this market. Further assume that they are able to "collude" on price and quantity of premium digital channel subscriptions to sell. As part of their collusive agreement they...
3,000 6,000 9,000 12,000 15,000 18,000 $120 $100 $ 80 $ 60 $ 40 $ 20 $ 0 1. Refer to Table 16-1. If there is only one digital cable TV company in this market, what price would it charge for a premium digital channel subscription to maximize its profit? 19.1$40 b.$60 10.580 d. $100 2. Refer to Table 16-1. Assume that there are two digital cable TV companies operating in this market. If they are able to "collude" on...
The Table below shows the total demand for cable TV subscriptions for a monopoly. Assume that the monopolist incurs an annual fixed cost of $100,000 and that the marginal cost of providing an additional subscription is always $100. Quantity Price (per year) 0 $400 2,000 $350 4,000 $300 6,000 $250 8,000 $200 10,000 $150 12,000 $100 14,000 $50 16,000 $0 What is the profit maximising level of quantity and price? What is the profit at this level of output?...