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- - 3. Refer to Table 16-1. Assume that there are two profit-maximizing digital cable TV companies operating in this market.
Table 16-1 Quantity 3,000 6,000 9,000 12,000 15,000 18,000 Price (per year) $120 $100 $ 80 $ 60 $ 40 $ 20 $ 0
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Answer #1

(3) Each company will make a profit of - (c) $480,000

Reason - At price = $80 per year, and quantity = 6000, the profit = $480,000
and at another price level = $40 per year, and quantity = 12,000, the profit = $480,000.
Hence, if both the companies collude, they control the entire market and can make an equally better off profit of $480,000 each if any of the situations are chosen by either companies. It is better than say choosing a total profit of $540,000 at price = $60, when the profit for each company is 540,000/ 2 = $270,000.

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