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3,000 6,000 9,000 12,000 15,000 18,000 $120 $100 $ 80 $ 60 $ 40 $ 20 $ 0 1. Refer to Table 16-1. If there is only one digital
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Answer #1
Quantity price total revenue
0 $120 0
3000 $100 3,00,000
6000 $80 4,80,000
9000 $60 5,40,000
12000 $40 4,80,000
15000 $20 3,00,000
18000 $0 0

Since marginal cost of providing service is zero, the maximum profit will be achieved where total revenue is maximum.

Here total revenue is maximun at $60 (5,40,000)

Answer of first part = $60

The firm maximizes it's profit when it charge $60.
At this price TR IS MAXIMUM AND AFTER THIS PRICE ITS TR falls.

Ans-2 b) p=$60;q=9000

This is because at this point TR is maximum and after this point TR falls. So a firm will produce 9000 at $60.

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