Homework Answers
As two firms collude, so joint profits are maximized
So Maximum Joint profit = total revenue
( Assuming cost is zero)
So π= 9000*60
= 540,000
So each gets = 540,000/2
= 270,000
= 270,000
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la IP will they charge, and how many subscriptions (Q) will they collectively sell? $40, Q...
Use the information below to answer the following questions. The information in the table below depicts...
Use the information below to answer the following questions. The information in the table below depicts the total demand for premium channel digital cable TV subscriptions in a small urban market. Assume that each digital cable TV operator pays a fixed cost of $100,000 (per year) to provide premium digital channels in the market area and that the marginal cost of providing the premium channel service to a household is zero. Table 16-1 Quantity 0 3,000 6,000 9,000 12,000 15,000...
3,000 6,000 9,000 12,000 15,000 18,000 $120 $100 $ 80 $ 60 $ 40 $ 20...
3,000 6,000 9,000 12,000 15,000 18,000 $120 $100 $ 80 $ 60 $ 40 $ 20 $ 0 1. Refer to Table 16-1. If there is only one digital cable TV company in this market, what price would it charge for a premium digital channel subscription to maximize its profit? 19.1$40 b.$60 10.580 d. $100 2. Refer to Table 16-1. Assume that there are two digital cable TV companies operating in this market. If they are able to "collude" on...
- - 3. Refer to Table 16-1. Assume that there are two profit-maximizing digital cable TV...
- - 3. Refer to Table 16-1. Assume that there are two profit-maximizing digital cable TV companies operating in this market. Further assume that they are able to "collude" on price and quantity of premium digital channel subscriptions to sell. As part of their collusive agreement they decide to take an equal share of the market. How much profit will each company make? a. $170,000 b. $40,000 c. $480,000 d. $540,000 Table 16-1 Quantity 3,000 6,000 9,000 12,000 15,000 18,000...
4. Refer to Table 16-1. Assume that there are two profit-maximizing digital cable TV companies operating...
4. Refer to Table 16-1. Assume that there are two profit-maximizing digital cable TV companies operating in this market. Further assume that they are not able to "collude" on price and quantity of premium digital channel subscriptions to sell. How many premium digital channel cable TV subscriptions will be collectively sold (by both firms) when this market reaches a Nash equilibrium? a. 3,000 b. 6,000 c. 9,000 d 12,000 Table 16-1 Quantity 0 3,000 6,000 9,000 12,000 15,000 18,000 Price...
2. Refer to Table 16-1. Assume that there are two digital cable TV companies operating in...
2. Refer to Table 16-1. Assume that there are two digital cable TV companies operating in this market. If they are able to collude" on price and quantity of subscriptions to sell, what price (P) will they charge, and how many subscriptions (0) will they collectively sell? a. P - $40, Q = 12,000 b. P=$60, Q -9,000 c. P-$80,- 6,000 d. P - $100, Q -3,000 Table 16-1 Quantity 3,000 6,000 9,000 12.000 15,000 18,000 Price (per year) $120...
4. Refer to Table 16-1. Assume that there are two profit-maximizing digital cable TV companies operating...
4. Refer to Table 16-1. Assume that there are two profit-maximizing digital cable TV companies operating in this market. Further assume that they are not able to "collude" on price and quantity of premium digital channel subscriptions to sell. How many premium digital channel cable TV subscriptions will be collectively sold (by both firms) when this market reaches a Nash equilibrium? 3.000 1.56,000 0.19.000 d. 12,000 5. Refer to Table 16-1. Assume that there are two profit-maximizing digital cable TV...
5. Refer to Table 16-1. Assume that there are two profit-maximizing digital cable TV companies operating...
5. Refer to Table 16-1. Assume that there are two profit-maximizing digital cable TV companies operating in this market. Further assume that they are not able to "collude" on price and quantity of premium digital channel subscriptions to sell. What price will premium digital channel cable TV subscriptions be sold at when this market reaches a Nash equilibrium? a $40 b. $60 c. $80 d. $100 Table 16-1 Quantity 0 3,000 6,000 9,000 12,000 15,000 18,000 Price (per year) $120...
Table 16-3 The information in the table below shows the total demand for premium-channel digital cable...
Table 16-3 The information in the table below shows the total demand for premium-channel digital cable TV subscriptions in a small urban market. Assume that each digital cable TV operator pays a fixed cost of $100,000 (per year) to provide premium digital channels in the market area and that the marginal cost of providing the premium channel service to a household is zero. Quantity 0 3,000 6,000 9,000 12,000 15,000 18,000 Price (per year) $120 $100 $80 $60 $40 $20...
The information in the table below depicts the total demand for premium channel digital cable TV...
The information in the table below depicts the total demand for premium channel digital cable TV subscriptions in a small urban market. Assume that each digital cable TV operator pays a fixed cost of $100,000 (per year) to provide premium digital channels in the market area and that the marginal cost of providing the premium channel service to a household is zero. Table 16-1 Price (per year) $120 3,000 $100 6,000 $ 80 9,000 12,000 $ 40 15,000 $ 20...
Use following information to answer 36-40 Sal's satellite company broadcasts TV to subscribers in Los Angeles...
Use following information to answer 36-40 Sal's satellite company broadcasts TV to subscribers in Los Angeles and New York. The demand functions for each of these two groups are = 150-0.75PNY QLA=80-0.25PLA QNY where Q is in thousands of subscriptions per year and P is the subscription price per year. The cost of providing Q units of service is given by C 1000+ 40Q where Q = QNY +QLA 36. What are the profit-maximizing price and quantity for the New...
Use the information below to answer the following questions. The information in the table below depicts the total demand for premium channel digital cable TV subscriptions in a small urban market. Assume that each digital cable TV operator pays a fixed cost of $100,000 (per year) to provide premium digital channels in the market area and that the marginal cost of providing the premium channel service to a household is zero. Table 16-1 Quantity 0 3,000 6,000 9,000 12,000 15,000...
3,000 6,000 9,000 12,000 15,000 18,000 $120 $100 $ 80 $ 60 $ 40 $ 20 $ 0 1. Refer to Table 16-1. If there is only one digital cable TV company in this market, what price would it charge for a premium digital channel subscription to maximize its profit? 19.1$40 b.$60 10.580 d. $100 2. Refer to Table 16-1. Assume that there are two digital cable TV companies operating in this market. If they are able to "collude" on...
- - 3. Refer to Table 16-1. Assume that there are two profit-maximizing digital cable TV companies operating in this market. Further assume that they are able to "collude" on price and quantity of premium digital channel subscriptions to sell. As part of their collusive agreement they decide to take an equal share of the market. How much profit will each company make? a. $170,000 b. $40,000 c. $480,000 d. $540,000 Table 16-1 Quantity 3,000 6,000 9,000 12,000 15,000 18,000...
4. Refer to Table 16-1. Assume that there are two profit-maximizing digital cable TV companies operating in this market. Further assume that they are not able to "collude" on price and quantity of premium digital channel subscriptions to sell. How many premium digital channel cable TV subscriptions will be collectively sold (by both firms) when this market reaches a Nash equilibrium? a. 3,000 b. 6,000 c. 9,000 d 12,000 Table 16-1 Quantity 0 3,000 6,000 9,000 12,000 15,000 18,000 Price...
2. Refer to Table 16-1. Assume that there are two digital cable TV companies operating in this market. If they are able to collude" on price and quantity of subscriptions to sell, what price (P) will they charge, and how many subscriptions (0) will they collectively sell? a. P - $40, Q = 12,000 b. P=$60, Q -9,000 c. P-$80,- 6,000 d. P - $100, Q -3,000 Table 16-1 Quantity 3,000 6,000 9,000 12.000 15,000 18,000 Price (per year) $120...
4. Refer to Table 16-1. Assume that there are two profit-maximizing digital cable TV companies operating in this market. Further assume that they are not able to "collude" on price and quantity of premium digital channel subscriptions to sell. How many premium digital channel cable TV subscriptions will be collectively sold (by both firms) when this market reaches a Nash equilibrium? 3.000 1.56,000 0.19.000 d. 12,000 5. Refer to Table 16-1. Assume that there are two profit-maximizing digital cable TV...
5. Refer to Table 16-1. Assume that there are two profit-maximizing digital cable TV companies operating in this market. Further assume that they are not able to "collude" on price and quantity of premium digital channel subscriptions to sell. What price will premium digital channel cable TV subscriptions be sold at when this market reaches a Nash equilibrium? a $40 b. $60 c. $80 d. $100 Table 16-1 Quantity 0 3,000 6,000 9,000 12,000 15,000 18,000 Price (per year) $120...
Table 16-3 The information in the table below shows the total demand for premium-channel digital cable TV subscriptions in a small urban market. Assume that each digital cable TV operator pays a fixed cost of $100,000 (per year) to provide premium digital channels in the market area and that the marginal cost of providing the premium channel service to a household is zero. Quantity 0 3,000 6,000 9,000 12,000 15,000 18,000 Price (per year) $120 $100 $80 $60 $40 $20...
The information in the table below depicts the total demand for premium channel digital cable TV subscriptions in a small urban market. Assume that each digital cable TV operator pays a fixed cost of $100,000 (per year) to provide premium digital channels in the market area and that the marginal cost of providing the premium channel service to a household is zero. Table 16-1 Price (per year) $120 3,000 $100 6,000 $ 80 9,000 12,000 $ 40 15,000 $ 20...
Use following information to answer 36-40 Sal's satellite company broadcasts TV to subscribers in Los Angeles and New York. The demand functions for each of these two groups are = 150-0.75PNY QLA=80-0.25PLA QNY where Q is in thousands of subscriptions per year and P is the subscription price per year. The cost of providing Q units of service is given by C 1000+ 40Q where Q = QNY +QLA 36. What are the profit-maximizing price and quantity for the New...
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