1) Distinguish between “Strategic Form' games and 'Extensive Form games. Give suitable examples for games where...
Give an example of an ((extensive form)) game with 2 players. In all steps each player has two options. Player I decides in step 1 and step 3. Player II decides in step 2. Player 2 has perfect information. In step 3 player I has forgotten the decision in step 1 and has imperfect information in step 2.
5. Distinguish between Normative Economics and Positive Economics, with suitable examples.
So far, we have two ways to write a game: extensive form and strategic form. One of these is more suited to sequential games, and one is more suited to simultaneous games. Explain why, with reference to a simple game that could be played sequentially or simultaneously.
Froblem #5: Convert extensive-form to strategic-form, find Nash equilibria and subgame. perfect Nash equilibria (12pts) Consider the following extensive-form game: Veto Y Don't Veto In this game, Players 1 and 2 are deciding on a course of action, which may be X, Y, or Z Player 2 is the one who actually makes the choice, but first Player may choose to veto Y, which is the option Player 1 prefers the least. a) List all the strategies available to Player...
A) Consider the extensive form game of complete and imperfect information above. The number of pure strategy Nash Equilibrium in the game is? (Please, type only numerical values, for example: 0, 1, 2, 3,....) B) Consider the extensive form game of complete and imperfect information above. The following strategy profiles are Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium (Select all that apply) a) (WY, AD) b) (WY, AC) c) (ZX, AD) d) (ZY, BC) e) (ZY, BD) ...
Distinguish between intentional or unintentional mobility. Give at least two examples of each.
Distinguish between altruism, kin selection, and reciprocal altruism. Give a few examples of each
Distinguish between the concepts of “sufficient” and "appropriate” as they apply to audit evidence. Give examples of evidence that is not relevant and/or not reliable. Refer back to the description of posting located on our course Syllabus to ensure you are in compliance to receive full credit.
3. The extensive form of a 2-person game is as follows: 1/ 2 020210 0 0-25-210 (a) What are the pure strategy sets for players I and II. (b) Derive the normal (strategic) form of the game? (c) Find the Nash Equilibrium(a) of the game (d) Is there any sub-game non-perfect equilibrium? Explain.
1. Give examples of how products have been globalized. 2. Explain the differences between norms, roles, rules, and networks. 3. Define a subculture and give examples of Canadian subcultures. 4. Distinguish between intercultural communication and intracultural communication. 5. Are business cultures necessarily aligned to national cultures?