Question

Discuss three ways J. P. Moreland critiques the Emergent Property View. Why does he do this?

Answer 1

Three ways of critique the EVM by J. P are:

To see these we must first clarify what epiphenomenalism involves. The view is also called holism, and when mind is seen to emerge through the coming together of the matter in a certain way (for instance, through the evolution of the central nervous system and brain) the position is called the emergent property view (EPV). Here are four main features of the EPV.

-The Emergent Property View Wholes and Parts In nature, wholes are often greater than the sum of their parts. Nature exhibits a hierarchy of systems— subatomic particles, atoms, molecules, cells, organs, whole organisms. Each level has properties of the wholes at that level which are not properties of their constituent parts. For example, water has the property of being wet, but this property is not true of either hydrogen or oxygen. Similarly, the mind is a property of the brain.

-Levels of Explanation and Complementarity Each level in the hierarchy can be explained by using con-cepts appropriate at that level. Further, at the levels are complementary. For example, an explanation ota person's behavior could be given at a psychological level which used the concepts beliefs, desires, or fears. The same behavior could be given an explanation at the neurophysiological level using the concepts neurons, synapses, and so forth. These two levels of explanation are not in competition; they complement one another by offering descriptions of the same behavior at different levels.

-Causation between Levels Lower levels in the hierarchy cause things to happen at higher levels but not vice versa. When it comes to persons, events at the physical level can be characterized in terms of physical laws which make no reference to the causal efficaciousness of future events (e.g., the purposes of the agent) or higher levels of organization. The events at the physical level obey deterministic physical laws and mental events are mere by-products.

He did it because For some time it has become increasingly obvious to more and more philosophers that consciousness is not physical. Still, it is widely believed to be a set of emergent properties possessed or generated by the brain. I disagree. I take consciousness to be possessed by the soul (or self), and to be interactively dependent on the brain while embodied. My research is to develop a critique of emergentist strategies that seek to forego a soul, while retaining a non-physical view of consciousness.