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2. Matthew is considering selling a painting in an English auction. There are n bidders whose valuations are distributed inde

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the bid is offered to one with 2)a) in an english auction highest valuation valuation at cost of toits second highest individ134) for any q, firm A chooses firm B objective is with (no - (012), -2004 La differentiate w.rit qq and set it to zero 90-91b) If firm À sets quantity first. It knows that for every d, it chooses, firm & will choose 70 - 9, we found it 3(a) a . as

If you want derivation for 2(a), please comment.

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