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Problem 5: Product Differentiation in a Bertrand Setting. Firms 1 and 2 face the same AC = MC = 30 but sell differentiated pr
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P.DI-30 D (P-30) D A-30) (40-t P213) CPg- 30) (40-Pat Pi/3) 1 1 a) BR func b) CA-30) -1) + (0-Pit fal3) =0 We 4o-it 3 tP -30)

P1 = 50+50/6 + P1/36

35P1/36 = 350/6

P1 = 350*36/(6*35)

P1 = 60

So P1* = 60 & P2* = 60

D) both reaction functions will get steeper, thus it implies more product Differentiation

So this will decrease competition

& So eqm prices will rise

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