2. Prove that 2-bridge knots are alternating in two steps (a) (Adams, Exercise 2.17) Prove that...
2. (Adams, Exercise 1.7) Show that by changing some of the crossings from over to under or vice versa, any projection of a knot can be made into a projection of the unknot.
Exercise 2.4. Prove the two statements below:Use nd ueTion 1. For every integer n 2 3, the inequality n2 2n +1 holds. Hint: You can prove this by induction if you wish, but alternatively, you can prove directly, without induction.) 2. For every integer n 2 5, the inequality 2" n holds. (Hint: Use induction and the inequality in the previous part of the exercise.)
PROOFS: Use these theorems and others to prove these statements. Theorem 1: The sum of two rational numbers is rational. Theorem 2: The product of two rational numbers is rational. Theorem 3: √ 2 is irrational. Induction: Prove that 6 divides n 3 − n for any n ≥ 0 Use strong induction to prove that every positive integer n can be written as the sum of distinct powers of 2. That is, prove that there exists a set of...
Question+ Let T be a tree. Prove, direct from the definition of tree, that: (a) Every edge of T is a bridge. Hint: If an edge e a,b E E(T) is not a bridge, is there a path from a to b that avoids e? Why? What does this imply about circuits? (b) Every vertex of T with degree more than 1 is a cut vertex. Hint: If E V(T) has degree 2 or more there must be a path...
23. Label the diagram of a muscle. 3 8 2 24. List the 4 steps to cross-bridge cycling. 8:45P
Adams company has a choice of two investment alternatives. the present value of cash inflows Exercise 16-7 Using the present value index LO 16-2 Adams Company has a choice of two investment alternatives. The present value of cash inflows and outflows for the first alternative is $130,000 and $102.000, respectively. The present value of cash inflows and outflows for the second alternative is $305,000 and $265,000, respectively Required a. Calculate the net present value of each investment opportunity. (Negative amounts...
2. Two players are bargaining, just as in the Rubinstein's alternating offers model studied in class, over the division of a cake of size 1. There are two differences from the standard model: first, there is no discounting. Second, while an acceptance guarantees implementation of the going proposal, following every rejection there is an exogenous probability p > 0 that the game will completely break down. If that happens, each player gets gets 0 <b < 1/2. If not, the...
1. Two players are bargaining, just as in the Rubinstein's alternating offers model studied in class, over the division of a cake of size 1. The difference is that player 1 has discount factor δί and player 2 has discount factor Assume that the one-shot deviation principle holds here (it does, but you dont have to prove it). a. Prove that there is a unique subgame- perfect equilibrium for this game, and describe the payoff to each proposer. b. Describe...
#1 & #2 Exercise 1. This exercise builds on the method used to prove that if a function differetiable at a point b, then it is also continuous at b. Suppose g : (-1,1) → R is a function such that g(0) = 7 and lim 9)-7-10 exists. Define G())7-10 on-l < x < 1 when x need to know the value of λ, but its existence is necessary in what follows. 0. Let λ be the limit of G(x)...
Exercise 1.9. Prove that, for any two finite sets A and B, |A ∪ B| = |A| + |B| − |A ∩ B|. This is a special case of the inclusion-exclusion principle.