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Consider an oligopolistic market with demand represented by P=250-5Q. Assume that the MC for each firm is MC 50. a) If the fi

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o) In the Cae e pce cempeftion , each output level och that p-MC So, given that arket ice, Mc 50 And P- a50-50 put p= 50 50-TR500 Manginal Revenue HR dTR Para MR Mc ber 50100 50 maimi2ation P-350-50 50-5x00 P 150 Total Revenue :TR: png 150 0 IR: 300mawket demand i qiven b and eachhe N öms hos Censtotginal Cet c, then eum prc i given by a+Nc Here N-2, a:250, C-50, b-50 850(t 31333. 33 (구구구-78 Total Industry floh 1777 78 a+NC Pe 850 + 3x50 Now P 50- 5 30 Output ot each binm q/3 -30/3 Total cest TTotal Revenue :Te- pq=1Dot 30 TR 300D Total Trdusty prob TR-TC = 3000-1500 τ 1500 ửi ) Here N-5, a:050 , c-50,b-50 L at Nc P

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