3. Properties of an Unspecified Social Welfare Function: You are given a social welfare function that satisfies the independence of irrelevant alternatives and Pareto criteria. There are two indi...
3. Properties of an Unspecified Social Welfare Function: You are given a social welfare function that satisfies the independence of irrelevant alternatives and Pareto criteria. There are two individuals ea and b and three alternatives z, y, and z. When the individual preferences are Individual a: zyr Individual b: x y-z, the social welfare function produces the social ranking a. What can you deduce about the social ranking produced for the following new list of preferences? Individual a:y Individual b: a>y*i b. Does this social welfare function satisfy the universal domain criterion? Why or why not?
3. Properties of an Unspecified Social Welfare Function: You are given a social welfare function that satisfies the independence of irrelevant alternatives and Pareto criteria. There are two individuals ea and b and three alternatives z, y, and z. When the individual preferences are Individual a: zyr Individual b: x y-z, the social welfare function produces the social ranking a. What can you deduce about the social ranking produced for the following new list of preferences? Individual a:y Individual b: a>y*i b. Does this social welfare function satisfy the universal domain criterion? Why or why not?