In the above figure of a game between player 1 and 2 choosing between shaking (S) and pushing (P). What are their payoffs in a backward induction solution to the game?
In the above figure of a game between player 1 and 2 choosing between shaking (S) and pushing (P). What are their payof...
5. Consider the game given in the adjoining (Figure 1). Player l's actions in the initial node o are X and E. At the node c, player 1 has two actions 1 and r. Player 2's actions at the node a are li and r1. Player 2's available actions at the node b are l2 and r2. The payoffs are given in the terminal nodes. The first entry in any payoff vector corresponds to the paoff to player 1, and...
Problem 2 Game 2 represents the interaction between firms choosing to restrict emissions or not. Game 2 shows the payoffs of two firms, Ample (A) and Millmart (M) each with strategies to Pay a Living Wage or Not. Table 2: Amble & Millmart choose wages Millmart Pay Don't 5,5 1,3 3.1 4.4 Pay Ample Don't True or False & Explain The game has two Nash equilibria: (Pay. Pay) and (Don't. Don't). Calculating the expected payoffs to Pay and Don't with...
Consider a game being played between player 1 and player 2. Player 1 can choose T or B. Player 2 can take actions Lor R. These choices are made simultaneously. The payoffs are as follows. If 1 plays T and 2 plays L, the payoffs are (0, 0) for Player 1 and 2, respectively. If 1 opts of B and 2 L, the payoffs are (5,7). If 1 plays T and 2 R, the payoffs are (6,2). Finally, both players...
Consider a game being played between player 1 and player 2. Player 1 can choose T or B. Player 2 can take actions Lor R. These choices are made simultaneously. The payoffs are as follows. If 1 plays T and 2 plays L, the payoffs are (0,0) for Player 1 and 2, respectively. If 1 opts of B and 2 L, the payoffs are (5,7). If 1 plays T and 2 R, the payoffs are (6,2). Finally, both players get...
Question 2 Consider the following extensive form game. R 2 a А/ B 2,3 / 1 \ь 3, x 3,0 1, Each value of x defines a different game. 1. Solve this game by backward induction for x = 0 and for x = 2. For each of those values of x, what are the payoffs that player 2 can get in the solution? 2. Write this game in Normal form (The table can have an entry of the form...
2. Consider the following sequential game. Player A can choose between two tasks, Tl and T2. After having observed the choice of A, Player B chooses between two projects Pl or P2. The payoffs are as follows: If A chooses TI and B chooses P1 the payoffs are (12, 8), where the first payoff is for A and the second for B; if A chooses T1 and B opts for P2 the payoffs are (20, 7); if A chooses T2...
Consider the following game: Player 1 announces an integer p in the interval (1.201. Player 2 then announces an integer g in the interval (21.40) . Ifp-1, then the game is a tie (each player gets a payoff of zero). . If q is prime, then Player 1 wins (the payoffs are (1,-1). . If pand q have a common factor greater than 1, then Player 1 wins (the payoffs are (1,-1). If pand qare relatively prime (but g is...
3. (15 points) Consider a sequential game with two players with three-moves, in which player 1 moves twice: Player 1 chooses Enter or Erit, and if she chooses Exit the game ends with payoffs of 2 to player 2 and 0 to player 1. • Player 2 observes player l's choice and will have a choice between Fight or Help if player 1 chose Enter. Choosing Help ends the game with payoffs of 1 to both players. • Finally, player...
2. Consider the following sequential game. Player A can choose between two tasks, TI and T2. After having observed the choice of A, Player B chooses between two projects P1 or P2. The payoffs are as follows: If A chooses TI and B chooses Pl the payoffs are (12.8), where the first payoff is for A and the second for B; if A chooses TI and B opts for P2 the payoffs are (20,7); if A chooses T2 and B...
1. Consider the coupon game. But suppose that instead of decisions being made simultaneously, they are made sequentially, with Firm 1 choosing first, and its choice observed by Firm 2 before Firm 2 makes its choice. a. Draw a game tree representing this game. b. Use backward induction to find the solution. (Remember that your solution should include both firms’ strategies, and that Firm 2’s strategy should be complete!) 2. Two duopolists produce a homogeneous product, and each has a...