Suppose a hospital only needs one input, nurses, to treat their
patients. A public insurer reimburses each treatment at $10 and
suppose that the hospital needs to hire L nurses to provide T = 5L
− 1/20 ∗L^2 treatments. Hospitals pay their nurses a wage W and
suppose that 5 + W/2 nurses are willing to work at the hospital for
a wage W.
Imagine that the hospital acts as a monopsonist in the labor market
(monopoly in employment). What is the profit maximizing employment
level and what would be the corresponding wage? Quantify the
deadweight loss.
Suppose a hospital only needs one input, nurses, to treat their patients. A public insurer reimburses each treatment at...
Suppose a hospital only needs one input, nurses, to treat their patients. A public insurer reimburses each treatment at $10 and suppose that the hospital needs to hire L nurses to provide T = 5L − 1/20 ∗L^2 treatments. Hospitals pay their nurses a wage W and suppose that 5 + W/2 nurses are willing to work at the hospital for a wage W. In perfect competition, what would be the equilibrium wage and employment level?
Suppose a hospital only needs one input, nurses, to treat their patients. A public insurer reimburses each treatment at $10 and suppose that the hospital needs to hire L nurses to provide T = 5L − 1/20 ∗L^2 treatments. Hospitals pay their nurses a wage W and suppose that 5 + W/2 nurses are willing to work at the hospital for a wage W. Specify the hospital’s demand curve for nurses as well as the nurses’ labor supply curve. Also...
Problem 1 Suppose you the owner of a hospital that treats patients in a particular city and that you are the only available hospital around. Your cost structure is such that the marginal cost of treating an extra patient is equal to MC(q)= (1/2) q What is the price you would charge if you only treated privately insured patients that have the following demand curve: P(q) = 150 – q Problem 2 Now suppose that 100 elderly people moved into...