Consider a game with two players deciding simultaneously how much to donate for a party. Let d1 be the amount donated by player 1 and d2 the amount donated by player 2, where both d1 and d2 are nonnegative real numbers. Once the money is donated players cannot get it back, no matter whether the party is organized or not. They will be able to organize the party if and only if the sum of their donations is more than or equal to 150 dollars i.e.,
If they organize the party, Player 1's payoff is , Player 2's payoff is . If they do not organize the party, their payoffs are and .
Which of the following are Nash equilibrium donations (select all that apply)
a. |
d1 =0 and d2 =0. |
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b. |
d1 =90 and d2 =90. |
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c. |
d1 =90 and d2 =60. |
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d. |
d1 =75 and d2 =75. |
Consider a game with two players deciding simultaneously how much to donate for a party. Let...
Please help!!! Game theory Consider a game with two players deciding simultaneously how much to donate for a party. Let d1 be the amount donated by player 1 and d2 the amount donated by player 2, where both d1 and d2 are nonnegative real numbers. Once the money is donated players cannot get it back, no matter whether the party is organized or not. They will be able to organize the party if and only if the sum of their...
Consider a game with two players deciding simultaneously how much to donate tor a party. Let d be the amcunt donated by player 1 and dy the amount donated by player 2, where both di and d are nonnegative real numbers. Once the money is donated players. cannot get i back, no matter whether the party is organized or not They will be able to organize the party if and only if the sum of their donaticns is mcre than...
Consider again the game with two players deciding how much to donate for a party. However suppose now that Player 1 makes her donation first, and observing how much Player 1 has donated, Player 2 makes his donation. Let dy be the amount donated by player 1 and d2 the amount donated by player 2, where both d1 and d2 are nonnegative real numbers. Once the money is donated players cannot get it back, no matter whether the party is...
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