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Consider again the game with two players deciding how much to donate for a party. However suppose now that Player 1 makes her

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In a SPNE Player 1’s payoff is 90 and the amount Player 2 donates is 30

                            Explanation: SPNE stands for Sub-game Nash Equilibrium, which focuses on the various sub-game equilibriums that exist in between when a game is played. In this case, the total amount of donation for the party to happen is at least $120, and the payoff amount for layer 1 is 100-d1 and for Player 2 is 20-d2. Therefore, the if we calculate their Nash equilibrium at mid-game or sub-game level, then their total investment being 120 at least, the division factor of both players 1 and 2 would be (100-90=10) and (40-30=10) which therefore satisfies the sub-game requirement. Hence the Player 1’s payoff will be 90 and the amount Player 2 donates will be 30

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