Question

Consider a game with two players deciding simultaneously how much to donate tor a party. Let d be the amcunt donated by player 1 and dy the amount donated by player 2, where both di and d are nonnegative real numbers. Once the money is donated players. cannot get i back, no matter whether the party is organized or not They will be able to organize the party if and only if the sum of their donaticns is mcre than or equal to 10 dollars i.e., di d22 150 if they rgenze the party. Player 1's payc ffis πι 100 d. Player 25 payoff π.-100 d2 lf they do noi crgarnze the party, their payoffs are πι = a, and π,--dz which of the following are Nash Cquilibrium donations (solcct all that apply) a.d1-75 and d -75 b. d1-90 and d2-90 C. d1-90 and dh 60 □ d. d-d and d,-0.

Answer 1

Answer is option a,c, &d