Question

eco clean inc vs brown case

Summary:

Issue:

Rule:

Analysis:

Conclusion:

Answer 1

Summary: Eco–Clean argues that Brown failed to present sufficient evidence that the interior handle was unfit for its intended use. The Board of Regents argues that the trial court erred in dismissing its motion for a directed verdict because “Brown presented no evidence upon which a jury could have found [it] liable .”

Issue: Nicholas Brown was standing on the running board of Georgia Tech's Model A mascot car while it was being driven from a fraternity house to a garage. When the car turned a corner, the handle Brown was holding detached from the car and Brown fell, striking his head on the ground. Brown sued the Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia, which owned the Georgia Tech car, and Eco–Clean, Inc., which had refurbished the car two years earlier. He asserted that the defendants were directly or vicariously liable for negligently installing or maintaining the handle that detached from the car, that the Board of Regents negligently promoted the unsafe use of the car by students on public roads, and that the Board of Regents was vicariously liable under The Georgia Tort Claims Act, OCGA § 50–21–20 et seq., for any negligence on driver's part while he was maintaining the car on the Board's behalf.

Rule: The Georgia Tort Claims Act.

A) Provided limited waiver of sovereign immunity and prescribes certain torts for which the state is not liable.

B) The state is not held liable for losses that come as a result of the conduct of an agent of the state if these actions were outside of the scope of their duties.

Analysis: When deciding the outcome the court considered the case of Little Rapids Corp. v. McCamy, 218 Ga.App. 111, 113(1) (460 S.E.2d 800) (1995). The main point made from this was “assumption of risk does not extend to assuming the negligent act of another.” In this case, upon both defendants' requests, and over Brown's objection, the trial court charged the jury on assumption of risk. The charge properly instructed the jury that a defendant asserting an assumption of the risk defence had the burden of establishing that the plaintiff had actual knowledge of the danger, understood and appreciated the risk, and voluntarily exposed himself to the risk, but that “assumption of risk does not extend to assuming the negligent act of another.” The evidence presented did not demand a finding that Brown assumed the risk of injury as a matter of law due to improper installation of the handles or negligence of the driver. Accordingly, under the “any evidence” test, the trial court did not err in denying the defendants' motions for directed verdict based on their assumption of risk defence.

Conclusion: The board of regents argues that it should not be held responsible for “bad decisions made by its students.” The parties deposed an eyewitness to the incident who testified that the driver of the Georgia Tech car sped up and ran a red light before making the turn where Brown fell off. Because some evidence introduced at trial authorized the jury to determine that the board of regents was liable under an agency theory for the negligence of the driver, the trial court did not err in denying the board of regents’ motion for a directed verdict of liability. The court of appeals held that the student driver was an agent of Georgia Tech University and upheld the trial court’s award of damages to Brown.