Two physical therapy firms are exploring the possibility of merging. The data for each of these firms are:
Firm #1 Firm #2
Visits: 12,000 14,400
Marginal Cost: $25.00 $25.00
Fixed Costs: $75,000 $100,000
Market Share: 10% 12%
After the merger, marginal costs are expected to stay the same at $25.00 per visit. Combined fixed costs are estimated to remain at $175,000. If there were no loss of patients, the combined volume for the merged firms would be 26,400 visits, or a 22% market share.
The overall price elasticity of demand for physical therapy is estimated to be -0.40.
The Assigned Analysis
Two physical therapy firms are exploring the possibility of merging. The data for each of these...
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