Question

Firm 1 moves first and chooses its quantity. Firm 2 moves second and decides whether to enter on not. If it enters it pays a

0 0
Add a comment Improve this question Transcribed image text
Answer #1

1- Leadis 2 - Follower F=225 - mc=60 P = 100-X whue x is total output _X = X,+x2 - Leady Fellowes output output = Revenue - C2 T - oxi 100 - X1 - 20-60=0 - - XH = 20 Xo = 100-X, -60 To = 20 2 X = alo X: +X2 30 Scanned with CamScanner nneth _

Note that when X=30 , P = 70 1 = Revenue - Cost = 70 X 10 -(225+ boxlo) which is (-) ve The more firm 2 decides not to enter.100-2X=60

x=20

1- Leadis 2 - Follower F=225 - mc=60 P = 100-X whue x is total output _X = X,+x2 - Leady Fellowes output output = Revenue - Cost I P. 42 - (225 + 60 X2) = 1100 - X.-X1) X2 - 225 – 60X2 2720 dX 10o-X, -28z - 600 - 100 - X; - 60 X2 - 2 now, Fol Firm I 7 - P. x, - 608, = 600 - XL-X2.) X, - 60 X1 1100 - X - 100 + X1 + 30 2 2 Oxy - floo - X1 – 20144 - 60X7 Scanned, with Camom

2 T - oxi 100 - X1 - 20-60=0 - - XH = 20 Xo = 100-X, -60 To = 20 2 X = alo X: +X2 30 Scanned with CamScanner nneth _

Note that when X=30 , P = 70 - 7 = Revenue - Cost = 70X10- (225+ boxlo) which is (-)ve Theufore him 2 decides not to enter whead Now l U p=100-X . Considu Film I only TRE 0 0 - XX I I MR = 100-2X 1 MR=mc 2x = 60 21x230 frescanned-with- CS CamScanner Spiral

Add a comment
Know the answer?
Add Answer to:
Firm 1 moves first and chooses its quantity. Firm 2 moves second and decides whether to...
Your Answer:

Post as a guest

Your Name:

What's your source?

Earn Coins

Coins can be redeemed for fabulous gifts.

Not the answer you're looking for? Ask your own homework help question. Our experts will answer your question WITHIN MINUTES for Free.
Similar Homework Help Questions
  • 6. (6 pts) In a Stackelberg model of quantity competition, firm 1 moves first by commiting...

    6. (6 pts) In a Stackelberg model of quantity competition, firm 1 moves first by commiting to a level of output, and firm 2 moves second after observing firm 1's choice. The market inverse demand curve is given by: P = 110-Q and the firms' cost structures are given by: CQ) K10Q where Kis a fixed cost of production (a Suppos A = 0. Find the quantities and profits for each firm in the subgame perfect Nash equiibru. (4 pts)...

  • Two firms compete and choose quantities. Firm 1 chooses first (unchangeable) Demand is given by D(p)...

    Two firms compete and choose quantities. Firm 1 chooses first (unchangeable) Demand is given by D(p) = 300 − 3p and each firm’s marginal cost is MC(q) = 3q. What quantity does firm 1 choose? What quantity does firm 2 choose? What is the market price?

  • 13. In a Bertrand oligopoly a) each firm chooses simultaneously and non-cooperatively how much to b)...

    13. In a Bertrand oligopoly a) each firm chooses simultaneously and non-cooperatively how much to b) each firm chooses simultaneously and non-cooperatively its own product's c) one firm acts as a quantity leader, choosing its quantity first, while all other d) each firm makes its profit-maximizing decision while considering the entire produce to maximize its own profit. price to maximize its own profit. firms act as followers, choosing their quantities second and in reaction to the leader. market demand, the...

  • There are three firms: firm 1, firm 2 and firm 3. Each firm i chooses the...

    There are three firms: firm 1, firm 2 and firm 3. Each firm i chooses the level of production qi. The market price is determined by market demand: p = 24 – 91 - 92 - 43. And the marginal cost of production is zero. (a) Suppose firm 1 moves first, then firm 2 moves and finally firm 3 moves. Each firm can observe the previous firms' production strategies. Find all the subgame perfect equilibria. (b) Suppose firm 1 moves...

  • Two profit-maximizing firms compete in a market. Firm 1 chooses quantity qı > 0 and Firm...

    Two profit-maximizing firms compete in a market. Firm 1 chooses quantity qı > 0 and Firm 2 chooses quantity 42 > 0. The market price is: p(91,92) = 8 - 2q1 - 42. The cost to Firm 1 of producing qi is C1 = 41. The cost to Firm 2 of producing 92 is C2 = 42 + 42. a.) * Calculate the best-response function for each firm. b.) Suppose the two firms choose their quantities simultaneously. What is the...

  • Duopoly quantity-setting firms face the market demand p 270-Q Each firm has a marginal cost of...

    Duopoly quantity-setting firms face the market demand p 270-Q Each firm has a marginal cost of $15 per unit What is the Coumot equilibrium? The Cournot equilibrium quantities for Firm 1 (q1) and Firm 2 (42) are -85 units 02- 85units. (Enter numeric responses using real numbers rounded to two decimal places.) 10 and PM The Cournot equilbrium price is he Counot equilibrium? mot equilibrium quantities for Firm 1 (91) and Firm 2 (42) are 1 85 units 2 85...

  • 1) In Cournot equilibrium each firm chooses the quantity that maximizes its own profits assuming that...

    1) In Cournot equilibrium each firm chooses the quantity that maximizes its own profits assuming that the firm’s rival will continue to sell at the same price as before.In Cournot equilibrium each firm chooses the quantity that maximizes its own profits assuming that the firm’s rival will continue to sell at the same price as before. Q: Why it is false? 2) Suppose that the demand curve for an industry’s output is a downward-sloping straight line and there is constant...

  • 2. Two firms produce homogeneous products. Market demand is given by Q = 40-P, and each firm face...

    2. Two firms produce homogeneous products. Market demand is given by Q = 40-P, and each firm faces a marginal cost of production of 4 per unit The timing of the game is as follows. In Period 1, firm 1 chooses the quantity q it will sell. In Period 2, firm 2 (who observed firm 1s choice in period 1) chooses whether or not to enter the market. If firm 2 chooses to enter it must pay an entry fee...

  • If the incumbent can purchase new equipment: 1. he can either produce with the old equipment...

    If the incumbent can purchase new equipment: 1. he can either produce with the old equipment at marginal cost c =8, or 2 spend K = 5 for new equipment which cust its marginal cost to c = 6. Questions: 1. If the incumbent had purchased new equipment and anticipates entry, what quantity does he produce? 2. Will he enter the market? 3. What is the incumbent's payoff? 4. Will the incumbent choose to purchase new equipment in the first...

  • Duopoly, quantity-setting firms face the market demand p = 270 - Q. Each firm has a...

    Duopoly, quantity-setting firms face the market demand p = 270 - Q. Each firm has a marginal cost of $30 per unit. What is the Cournot equilibrium? The Cournot equilibrium quantities for Firm 1 (91) and Firm 2 (92) are 91 = units and 92 = units. (Enter numeric responses using real numbers rounded to two decimal places.)

ADVERTISEMENT
Free Homework Help App
Download From Google Play
Scan Your Homework
to Get Instant Free Answers
Need Online Homework Help?
Ask a Question
Get Answers For Free
Most questions answered within 3 hours.
ADVERTISEMENT
ADVERTISEMENT
ADVERTISEMENT