Player IlI Player II Player I A 1,1,-1 444 B 7,5,7 1,6,3 A 33,03,1,7 Player I...
Game theory Player 2 DEF A 1,1 1,11,1 Player I B ,8 7,51,1 C5,7 8,3 1,1 The following strategy profiles are stage Nash equilibria (select all that apply) a.(C,D b. (B,E R2. С. (AP) O e. (CE) . (B,F
QUESTTON 4 Player Il E D A 3,34,21,4 B 2,0 3,0-1,1 с 1,1 2,1 0,2 Player Consider the game above. Select all that apply. a Strategy B weakly dominates C. Strategy D weakly dominates E. c. The game does not have a dominant strategy solution. d. F is a dominant strategy. e. (A,D) is the dominant strategy solution.
Player lI C D E A 0,0 0,2 2,1 В 1,2 1,1 0,0 Player B Consider the strategic form game above and select all that apply. Strategy A is not dominant for Player 1. Strategy B is weakly dominant for player I. Strategy E is dominated by strategies C and D for player 2. Strategy E is never a best response.
QUESTION Player I A 6,6 2,7 2,-2 Player B 74 2,-2 1,1 C 2.2 1,1 1,1 in which the stage game above is repeated twice and there is no discounting. The following are SPNE outcomes in the repeated game (select all that apply) a (AD) in the first period, (AD) in the second period. □ b. (B,F) in the first period, (B,F) in the second period. c·(CF) in the first period, (C,F) in the second period. d.(B.F) in the first...
QUESTION 5 Player III PlayerII Player lI Player i A 11,1 444 A 3,3,0 3,1,7 B 118 31A Player I B 7,5,7 -1,6,3 Consider the stage game above and suppose it is repeated twice without discounting. Consider all possible SPNE in pure strategies for the twice repeated game. The highest payoff Player 1 can get in a SPNE is The highest payoff Player 2 can get in a SPNE is . Finally, the highest payoff Player 3 can get in...
Player II D E F A 2,6 0A 4A В 3,3 0,0 1,5 С 1,1 3,5 2,3 Player Consider the game above. Suppose Player 1 conjectures that Player 2 plays D with probability 1/4, E with probability 1/8, and F with probability 5/8. Player 1's best response to her conjecture about Player 2's strategy is to play a. A b. B OC.C . Another mixed strategy.
QUESTION 9 Consider the stage game below and suppose it is repeated twice Player 2 D E F A 1,1 1,1 1,1 Player I B 1,8 7,5 1.1 с 5,7 | 8,3 | 1,1 The following strategy profiles are stage Nash equilibria (select all that apply) e (B,E
Player II A 5,3 3,5 8,5 Player C 6,3 24 8,9 Consider the strategic form game above. In this game, the following strategy profiles are inefficient (Please, select all that apply) b. (A,F C (C,E) d. (B,E) e (B,D) f. (A,D) . (B,F
I SEE THAT SOME PEOPLE SAY A, AND OTHERS SAY C. WHICH ONE IS CORRECT, OR ARE THEY BOTH CORRECT? D E A 7,1 1,1 В 5,2 5,2 С 1,1 7,1 Player Consider the strategic form game above and select all that apply The game has two pure strategy Nash Equilibria Strategy B is a best response to strategy D. There is a mixed strategy equilibrium in the game. In the mixed strategy Nash Equilibrium of the game Player 1...
Please explain why the answer is what it is! QUESTION 9 Player 11 DE F 3,-1 1,1 6,1 4,-1 0,0 6,5 -1,-2 -2,-2 7,-1 Player B C Consider the game in normal form above and select all that apply. a. The strategy profile (B,D) is a Nash Equilibrium. Ub. There is a unique Nash Equilibrium in pure strategies. C. There is an equilibrium in mixed strategies. d. The strategy profile (C,F) is a Nash Equilibrium.