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Suppose that market demand is given by P 40-0.1Q. The two existing firms in the market engage in Bertrand competition and have MC-10. What is the market price and the quantity for each firm? Price is 10 and output per firm is 150 Price is 30 and output per firm is 25 Price is 25 and output per firm is 75 Price is 20 and output per firm is 100

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