1) The nash equilibirum is DR. Because, the payoff 5 of D is more than 1 (of U) and payoff 3 is more than 1(L). Hence, it is DR.
2) NE is DL. because -2 is more than -4 and 1 is more than 0. Thus, it is DL.
3) Two NEs are present here. One is DL because 3 is more than 2 and 1 is more than 0. ANother is UR because 3 is more than -1 and 3 is more than 2.
4) There is no pure nash equilibrium.
Part 1 Game Theory 1.Find all the NEs of the following Normal Form Games D 3,1...
Problem 2: Consider the following normal form game: | A | B | C D L 2 ,3 -1,3 0,0 4,3 M -1,0 3,0 / 0,10 2,0 R 1,1 | 2,1 3,1 3,1 Part a: What are the pure strategies that are strictly dominated in the above game? Part 6: What are the rationalizable strategies for each player? What are all the rationalizable strategy profiles? Part c: Find all of the Nash equilibria of the game above.
3. Consider the following game in normal form. Player 1 is the "row" player with strate- gies a, b, c, d and Player 2 is the "column" player with strategies w, x, y, z. The game is presented in the following matrix: W Z X y a 3,3 2,1 0,2 2,1 b 1,1 1,2 1,0 1,4 0,0 1,0 3,2 1,1 d 0,0 0,5 0,2 3,1 с Find all the Nash equilibria in the game in pure strategies.
1. Consider the following game in normal form. Player 1 is the "row" player with strate- gies a, b, c, d and Player 2 is the "column" player with strategies w, x, y, 2. The game is presented in the following matrix: a b c d w 3,3 1,1 0,0 0,0 x 2,1 1,2 1,0 0,5 y 0,2 1,0 3, 2 0,2 z 2,1 1,4 1,1 3,1 (a) Find the set of rationalizable strategies. (b) Find the set of Nash...
Consider the following extensive form game P1 RP:2 L2 R2 L1 R1 (2,2) (0,3) 1. How many sub-games are there in this game? What is the Subgame Perfect Equilibrium? 2. Represent this game as a Normal form game and find all pure strategy Nash Eq. Is there a mixed Nash eq. in this game? If yes, show one. If not, argue why not 3. Now assume that P2 cannot observe P1's action before he makes his move. As such, he...
1. Consider the following extensive game: F G 2,1 3,1 0,2 2,3 (i) List all of player 2's strategies. (2 points) (ii) Construct a payoff matrix and identify all Nash equilibria to the game. (2 points) (iii) Use backwards induction to find all subgame perfect equilibria of the game. (2 points)
Game Theory
7. Consider the following normal form game 1 2 A B A 1,4 2,0 B 0,8 3,9 Determine all of the Nash equilibria (pure and mixed) for this game.
Game Theory:
I only need help with 5 (a & b).
Will rate for correct and descriptive answers!
4 Draw the normal-form matrix for each of the following extensive-form games. C 0,0 E 2,2 F3,4 1 U 4,0 (b) 11 3,2 5) Use your normal-form matrix for (4a) above. Assume that ơi-( Find the following: , , ). a. ui(oi, CE
3. Represent the following extensive form game in a normal form game.(2 points) P1 Top Bottom P2 L L P1 (5,5) (1,1) R. (3,1) (1,3) (-1,-1) (0,0)
Find all pure strategy Nash Equilibria in the following games a.) Player 2 b1 b2 b3 a1 1,3 2,2 1,2 a2 2,3 2,3 2,1 a3 1,1 1,2 3,2 a4 1,2 3,1 2,3 Player 1 b.) Player 2 A B C D A 1,3 3,1 0,2 1,1 B 1,2 1,2 2,3 1,1 C 3,2 2,1 1,3 0,3 D 2,0 3,0 1,1 2,2 Player 1 c.) Player 2 S B S 3,2 1,1 B 0,0 2,3
2. Write the game below in normal form and find all Nash equilibria. a b 16,-10 4,0 + P1 a b 10,6 2,2 posle Z Nature of P2 a 0,2 p= 14 la