1. What tool do we need to show a static game in extensive-form representation?
2. What is the key to showing a dynamic game in normal-form representation?
Questions pertain to game theory
1. What tool do we need to show a static game in extensive-form representation? 2. What...
In the extensive form representation of the game between Player 1 and Player 2, Player 1 moves first and chooses L or R. If Player 1 chooses R the game ends, if Player 1 chooses L then Player 1 and 2 play a simultaneous move game. The game has______________ pure strategy Nash equilibria and__________ pure strategy Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibria (SPNE). The maximum payoff Player 2 gets in a SPNE is___________ . (Please, enter only numerical answers like: 1, 2,...
4. (General Extensive Form Game ID Suppose the following general extensive-form game. Player 1 Player 2 (0, 4) (4,0 (4, 0) (0, 4) (a) Represent this game in normal form by using a matrix, and find all pure strategy (Bayesian Nash equilibrium (equilibria) b) Does a pure strategy perfect Bayesian equilibrium exist? If so, show it (or them). If not, prove it.
3. General Extensive Form Game D Suppose the following general extensive form game 1/2 1/2 (2, 2) (2, 2) (0, 6) (6, 0 (0,0 (6, 4) (a) Represent this game in normal form by using a matrix, and find all pure strategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium (equilibria) b) Find pure strategy subgame perfect equilibrium (or equilibria) of this game. c) Find pure strategy perfect Bayesian equilibrium (or equilibria) of this game.
1. The following is the extensive-form representation (omitting payoffs) of a game: ·N = {1, 2, 3): . H = 10, A, B, C. Ay, An, Ayy, Ayr, Any, Ann. Ba, Bb. Bc,CY.CN,CYY, CYN,CNY, CNN): ·Z = {Ayy, Ayn, Any, Ann, Ba, Bb. Bc, CYy, CYN,CNY, CNN): (1) Draw the corresponding game tree of the game; (8 points) (2) Write down the sets of strategies for each player; (7 points) (3) Suppose the information sets in this game are: (0),...
3.2) (0,0) (24) 6,4) (0,) In the extensive form representation of the game between Player 1 and Flayer 2 Player 1 moves first and chooses L or R. If Player 1 chooses R the game ends, if Player 1 chooses L then Player 1 and 2 play a simultaneous move game. The game has pure strategy Nash equibra and pure strategy Subgame Pertect Nash Equnbia (SPNE). The maximum payott Flayer 2 gete in a SHNE IS Please, enter oniy numencal...
Consider the following extensive form game P1 RP:2 L2 R2 L1 R1 (2,2) (0,3) 1. How many sub-games are there in this game? What is the Subgame Perfect Equilibrium? 2. Represent this game as a Normal form game and find all pure strategy Nash Eq. Is there a mixed Nash eq. in this game? If yes, show one. If not, argue why not 3. Now assume that P2 cannot observe P1's action before he makes his move. As such, he...
3. The extensive form of a 2-person game is as follows: () (1019 (a) What are the pure strategy sets for players I and II? (b) Derive the normal (strategie) form of the game. (c) Use backward induction to find the sub-game perfect Nash Equi libria of the game. There are 2 SPNEs.) (d) Is there any other Nash Equilibrium?
1. Consider the following extensive form game with perfect information 1 Out 2 2 In 3 3 a) (Level A) Write down the normal form associated with this extensive form game (b) (Level A) First suppose -0. Find a subgame perfect equilibrium for this game (c) (Level B) Again suppose α-0. Find a pure strategy ash equilibrium of this extensive form game that is not subgame perfect (d) (Level B) Now suppose a-3. Find all pure strategy subgame perfect equi-...
1. Consider the following extensive form game with perfect information: 2 In 0 (a) (Level A) Write down the normal form associated with this extensive formm game (b) (Level A) First suppose = 0. Find a subgame perfect equilibrium for this game. (c) (Level B) Again suppose α-0. Find a pure strategy Nash equilibrium of this extensive form game that is not subgame perfect. (d) (Level B) Now suppose α = 3. Find all pure strategy subgame perfect equi- libria....
3. Represent the following extensive form game in a normal form game.(2 points) P1 Top Bottom P2 L L P1 (5,5) (1,1) R. (3,1) (1,3) (-1,-1) (0,0)